The Gita

What are the two verses that serve as two banks of the river of life?

"sraddhâvân labhathe jnânam":
One who has steadfastness and sincerity can obtain wisdom.

"samsayâtmâ vinasyati":
One who doubts will come to ruin.

The Internal Security Act

Internal Security Act is the legislation that enable the government to preserve the internal security, amonst its power it authorizes the arrest and detention without trial for a duration.

Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 1949
"If the Occupying Power considers it necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned residence or to internment."

Consider Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
"makes clear that no-one should be subjected to arbitrary detention and that deprivation of liberty must be based on grounds and procedures established by law".

We have the 'Internal Security Act (Malaysia)', 'Internal Security Act (Singapore)', 'Internal Security Act (South Africa)' and in America. Subversive Activities Control Act, McCarran Act . some Sections (not all) of the Subversive Activities Control Act, McCarran Act has been since ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

In Israeli this legislation is known as Administrative detention, applied to equally Palestinianian and occasionally Jewish right-wing extremists. The period of Administrative Detention orders goes up to 6 months where there is a reasonable threat to the security of the state and can be extended


The Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA) Malaysia was inherited from Britain ,in essence, it allows for the arrest of any person without the need for trial in certain defined circumstances for over 2 years. Initially and primarily needed for communist insurgents.

Section 8(1) of the ISA provides detention where the minister is satisfied that any person has acted in any manner prejudicial to the;
a) security of Malaysia or part thereof;
b) maintenance of essential services;
c) economic life.
Section 8(7), allows renewal of this 2 year period, indefinately

A Mareva Injunction

A mareva injunction is an equitable relief but not as to preserve the status quo but as an aide to execution. It is a preventive relief to restrain the Defendant from dissipating assets (out of the jurisdiction). All that the Plaintiff is required to show is that:- They have a prima facie case; The Defendant has assets within the jurisdiction; There is a real risk of assets being dissipated before judgment. Order 29, Rules of The High Court, 1980 Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulkcarriers [1975] 2 Llyods Rep 509 Ninemia Maritime Corp v Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH; The Niedersachsen [1984] 1 All ER 398, on appeal [1984] 1 All ER 413 S&F International Ltd v Transcon Engineering Sdn Bhd [1985] 1 MLJ 62 Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad v Lorrain Osman [1985] 2 MLJ 236 Biasamas Sdn Bhd & Ors v Kan Yan Heng & Anor [1998] 4 MLJ 1 Good arguable case All that is required to show in a good arguable case is that, on the evidence available, there is a fair chance that the Plaintiff can obtain judgment. Ninemia Maritime Corp v Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH; The Niedersachsen [1984] 1 All ER 398, on appeal [1984] 1 All ER 413. There is no need to show a case so strong as to warrant summary judgment. Biasamas Sdn Bhd & Ors v Kan Yan Heng & Anor [1998] 4 MLJ 1 A Mareva injunction case obtained more speedily than a summary judgment which may preclude the applicant from enjoying the fruits of his judgment. Third Chandris Shipping Corporation v Unimarine SA [1979] 2 All ER 972

DNA

Abstract

In a number of recent cases in the UK, convictions have been quashed by the Court of Appeal on the grounds that the jury had been misdirected as to the factual significance of random occurrence statistics. The mathematical basis on which those statistics are calculated was reviewed and recent appeal cases involving DNA evidence in the UK and the US were examined. It was found that a widespread misconception exists regarding the random occurrence ratio and its relationship with probability of guilt. It is in fact impossible to relate the two with any degree of accuracy without consideration of social and demographic factors particular to a case as well as any non-DNA evidence obtained.

http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0379073802001986

Also on complexity of evidence being out to a jury. (Malaysia has abolished jury trial long since)
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/publicat/judicature/article10.html

Carole McCartney

DNA evidence is a powerful investigative tool, able to incriminate as well as exculpate. Yet, increasingly common portrayals of DNA as being able to solve crimes almost instantaneously, beyond any doubt, even from ‘beyond the grave’, may overstate the degree to which DNA currently assists in criminal investigations. Strong government support, and financial investment in the DNA Expansion Programme, have been bolstered by repeated legislative extensions of police powers to obtain and retain DNA samples. Despite this, DNA evidence remains marginal in terms of assisting with overall criminal detections and experts now suggest that the massive National DNA Database expansion has not resulted in the improvement in detection rates originally anticipated. This paper also suggests potential concerns over the ‘tactical’ use of DNA evidence during suspect interviews, and the risk of abbreviated police investigations. Insufficiently ‘forensically aware’ police officers may resort to DNA evidence in lieu of proper detective work, with literature on ‘case construction’ informing analysis of potential pitfalls of early reliance on DNA results, which may increase the risk ‘tunnel vision’ in criminal investigations.

http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/46/2/175

more on DNA

The value of DNA evidence has to be seen in light of recent cases where criminals planted fake DNA samples at crime scenes. In one case, a criminal even planted fake DNA evidence in his own body: Dr. John Schneeberger of Canada raped one of his sedated patients in 1992 and left semen on her underwear. Police drew Schneeberger's blood and compared its DNA against the crime scene semen DNA on three occasions, never showing a match. It turned out that he had surgically inserted a Penrose drain into his arm and filled it with foreign blood and anticoagulants.(emphasis mine)

Evidence from an expert who has compared DNA samples must be accompanied by evidence as to the sources of the samples and the procedures for obtaining the DNA profiles. The judge must ensure that the jury must understand the significance of DNA matches and mismatches in the profiles. The judge must also ensure that the jury does not confuse the 'match probability' (the probability that a person that is chosen at random has a matching DNA profile to the sample from the scene) with the 'likelihood ratio' (the probability that a person with matching DNA committed the crime). In R v. Doheny, EWCA Crim 728 (1996). Phillips LJ gave this example of a summing up, which should be carefully tailored to the particular facts in each case:
Members of the Jury, if you accept the scientific evidence called by the Crown, this indicates that there are probably only four or five white males in the United Kingdom from whom that semen stain could have come. The Defendant is one of them. If that is the position, the decision you have to reach, on all the evidence, is whether you are sure that it was the Defendant who left that stain or whether it is possible that it was one of that other small group of men who share the same DNA characteristics.
Juries should weigh up conflicting and corroborative evidence, using their own common sense and not by using mathematical formulae, such as Bayes' theorem, so as to avoid "confusion, misunderstanding and misjudgment".

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNA_fingerprinting#Fake_DNA_evidence

Criminal Defamation, Malice and Public Figures

Defamation is a statement, written or oral (libel or slander respectively) which is published (to a 3rd party) to lower one’s self esteem in the estimation of the community/right thinking members of the society.

Criminal Defamation is where the state prosecutes the maker, unlike in civil cases where the victim sues the maker. Its origin’s and purpose was to predominantly defend “political leaders” or protect the smooth running of “stately functions”.

The criminalisation of defamation evinces the state’s/country’s interest in prosecuting such act, thus the penal slant to it. Such charges are rare because of the ever expansion of freedom of expression thoughts/laws in many countries.

In other words my right to say it outweighs your right to retrain me from doing so.

There are human rights organisation such as ARTICLE 19 with a specific mandate and focus on the defence and promotion of freedom of expression and freedom of information worldwide – “ We believe that all people have the right to freedom of expression and access to information, and that the full enjoyment of this right is the most potent force to achieve individual freedoms, strengthen democracy, and pre-empt repression, conflict, war and genocide”


But surely one’s right of expression cannot extend to publishing what is untrue, particularly in the case of public figures.

Thus, there is the defence of fair comment on a matter of public interest. In the American jurisdiction, its "equivalent" - the public figure doctrine.

Public Figures can rely on this protection. The test is simply one that acknowledges the presence or absence of malice. In the absence of malice such statements must be published knowing it to be false or with reckless disregard to its truth, i.e. the term “actual malice” - New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)


The primary Defence to Defamation is Justification in the British system or Truth in the American jurisdiction respectively.


Other defences of public interest are, firstly Privilege - Absolute and Qualified, the former cannot be sued on in its entirety (e.g. a judge’s judgement, dicta) even with the presence of malice and the latter, statements made furtherance to public interest or duty can only be sued if there is a malicious intent.

In English criminal law, mens rea , Latin for guilty mind, was considered in R v. Cunningham (1957) 2 AER 412

(1) an actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that in fact was done; or
(2) recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not (i.e. the accused has foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be done and yet has gone on to take the risk of it).

Thus, consider the element of intent in something done recklessly.

Therefore, if one makes a statement Recklessly, it could be said that such statement was made maliciously too. In this event, the Defence of Fair Comment, Privilege and Public Figure Doctrine must fail with the presence element of malice.

In Litigating, the element of Malice must be given its predominance.

the Rule of Law .. saved ?

reference is made to PP v. KOK WAH KUAN wherein an extract of the judgement is repruduced hereinbelow. The Federal Court composed of AHMAD FAIRUZ CJ, ABDUL HAMID MOHAMAD PCA, ALAUDDIN MOHD SHERIFF CJ (MALAYA), RICHARD MALANJUM CJ (SABAH & SARAWAK), ZAKI TUN AZMI FCJ.

some interesting points in the judgement

"Judges have wide discretion in determining when they apply and to what extent".

and then the learned judge proceeded with examples

1. Formulating original precedents

Life is larger than the law and there is no dearth of novel situations for which there is no enacted rule on point. In such situations a judge relies on the customs and traditions of the land and on standards, doctrines and principles of justice that are embedded in the life of the community to lay down an "original precedent" to assist the court. Admittedly, this fashioning of a new precedent is an infrequent occurrence but its impact on legal growth is considerable;

2. Overruling earlier precedents
Judicial creativity is fully in play when a previous precedent is overruled and thereby denied the authority of law. The overruling may be retrospective or prospective. In either case a new principle is contributed to the legal system and a new direction is forged;

3. Constitutional review
Under arts. 4(1) and 128 of the Federal Constitution, the Superior Courts of this country have the power to review the validity of legislative and executive actions by reference to norms of the basic law. If a legislative measure is found by the court to be unconstitutional, the court has a number of choices. It may condemn the entire statute as illegal or it may apply the doctrine of severability and invalidate only the sections that are unconstitutional and leave the rest of the statute intact. The court may declare the statute null and void ab-initio or only from the date of the ruling. For instance in Dato’ Yap Peng v. PP [1987] 2 MLJ 31 the Supreme Court invalidated s. 418A of the Criminal Procedure Code prospectively.
Questions of constitutionality are fraught with political and policy considerations and decisions thereon can influence the course of legal and political development. For example in Faridah Begum v. Sultan Ahmad Shah [1996] 2 CLJ 159 the majority held that the 1993 constitutional amendment removing the immunities of the Sultans cannot apply to suits brought by foreigners.
Article 162(6) of the Federal Constitution allows judges to modify pre-Merdeka laws in order to make such laws conform to the Constitution. Modification is without doubt a legislative task.

4. Statutory interpretation
In interpreting pre-existing law a judge is not performing a mere robotic function. The interpretive task is, by its very nature, so creative that it is indistinguishable from law-making. "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." (per the American jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes). This is specially so in constitutional law. Even if it is accepted that a judge is bound by the intention of the legislature, it must be noted that such an intention is not always clearly defined. The formal law is so full of ambiguities, gaps and conflicts that often a judge has to reach out beyond the statute to seek a solution to the problem at hand. (See: Chiu Wing Wa & Ors v. Ong Beng Cheng [1994] 1 CLJ 313). A judge may scrutinise preambles, headings and extraneous materials like explanatory statements that accompany Bills and parliamentary debates to help unravel the meaning of statutory formulae. A judge may lean on the interpretation clauses of a statute or on the Interpretation Act 1948/1967 to decipher the intention of the legislature. Or he may fall back on a wealth of rules of statutory construction to aid his task. So numerous and varied are these rules that judicial discretion to rely on one rule or another cannot be predicted. Sometimes a judge’s attention is drawn to foreign legislation and related precedents. He may declare the overseas statute to be in pari materia with local legislation and, therefore, relevant to the case. Alternatively, he may pronounce the local law to be sui generis and therefore to be viewed in the local context without aid of foreign decisions.
When the enacted law leads to undesirable or unjust results, a judge may be persuaded to add moral or public policy shades to the issue in order to do justice.
One could also note, for instance, the "public interest" interpretation of art. 5(3) of the Federal Constitution in Ooi Ah Phua v. Officer-In-Charge Criminal Investigation, Kedah/Perlis [1975] 1 LNS 117 in which the court held that the constitutional right to legal representation can be postponed pending police investigation. In Teoh Eng Huat v. Kadhi Pasir Mas [1990] 2 CLJ 11; [1990] 1 CLJ (Rep) 277 the "wider interest of the nation" prevailed over a minor’s right to religion guaranteed by art. 11. In Hajjah Halimatussaadiah v. Public Services Commission [1992] 1 CLJ 413; [1992] 2 CLJ (Rep) 467 the court subjected a public servant’s claim of a religious right to wear purdah at the workplace to the need to maintain "discipline in the service".
A judge is not required to view a statute in isolation. He is free to view the entire spectrum of the law in its entirety; to read one statute in the light of related statutes and relevant precedents; to understand law in the background of a wealth of presumptions, principles, doctrines and standards that operate in a democratic society. (See: Kesultanan Pahang v. Sathask Realty Sdn. Bhd. [1998] 2 CLJ 559). He is justified in giving effect to what is implicit in the legal system and to crystallize what is inherent. Such a holistic approach to legal practice is justified because "law" in art. 160(2) is defined broadly to include written law, common law and custom and usage having the force of law.

5. Operation of doctrine of binding precedent
The doctrine of binding judicial precedent exists to promote the principle of justice that like cases should be decided alike. It also seeks to ensure certainty, stability and predictability in the judicial process. There can be no denying that the existence of this doctrine imposes some rigidity in the law and limits judicial choices. But one must not ignore the fact that some flexibility and maneuverability still exist.
Though a superior court is generally reluctant to disregard its own precedents, it does have the power "to refuse to follow" its earlier decisions or to cite them with disapproval. Our Federal Court has, on some occasions, overruled itself. High Court judges occasionally refuse to follow other High Court decisions. An inferior court can maneuver around a binding decision through a host of indirect techniques.

6. Application of doctrine of ultra vires
Whether an agency has acted ultra vires is a complex question of law that permits judicial creativity.
Some statutes declare that discretion is absolute or that a decision is final and conclusive. Some statutory powers are conferred in broad and subjective terms. To statutory formulae of this sort, contrasting judicial responses are possible. The court may interpret them literally and give judicial sanction to absolute powers.
Alternatively the court may read into the enabling law implied limits and constitutional presumptions of a rule of law society. This will restrict the scope of otherwise unlimited powers. (See: R v. Lord Chancellor, Ex p Witham [1998] QB 575). Subjective powers may be viewed objectively. Purposive interpretation may be preferred over literal interpretation. (See: Public Prosecutor v. Sihabduin bin Haji Salleh & Anor [1981] CLJ 39; [1981] CLJ (Rep) 82).
When procedural violations are alleged, a decisive but discretionary issue is whether the procedure was mandatory or directory. Violation of a mandatory procedure results in nullity. Violation of a directory requirement is curable.

7. Import of rules of natural justice
Rules of natural justice are non-statutory standards of procedural fairness. They are not nicely cut up and dried and vary from situation to situation. Judges have wide discretion in determining when they apply and to what extent

Consider Public Prosecutor v. Kok Wah Kuan which has been reproduced in this blog "But as judges we have to apply the law as it exists. We simply have no choice whatever in the matter."

Address by YA Dato' Vincent Ng Kim Khoay

For some of you that have inquired and whom I have spoken, the learned Judge's address is reproduced herein for your easy reading. It will be posted in my blog for a bit. Do be inspired.


Address by YA Dato' Vincent Ng Kim Khoay on marriage of his son, Mr. Michael Ng on 30 November 2007

Y.Bhg. Datin Hamidah Chong, the graceful representative of YAA Dato’ Abdul Hamid Haji Mohamad, President of Court of Appeal and Acting C.J., Puan Ambiga Sreevenasan, Chairman of the Malaysian Bar Council, my brothers and sisters at the Bench, my former brothers and sisters at law for over a score and six years, Tan Sri-Tan Sri, Dato’ Sri-Dato Sri, Dato’-Dato’, Datin-Datin and my very dear friends.
Surely, this auspicious occasion must concern the marriage couple and the societal institution of marriage. About the bridegroom: from the locale of tonight’s function you may have observed that my son Michael is an incorrigible environmentalist. He rejected air-conditioning and has chosen to make this public declaration of his union with his beloved wife in this wonderful romantic setting of green grass, natural fresh air, a hoped for starry skies, ivory coloured upholstery for the table and chairs placed before a cool water backdrop and all conjoined with soft lilting string instruments music. I thought I had guided Michael to focus and plan correctly. Little did I know that he could focus so well, so as to be in accord with the future trend of greening the Earth, and planed the whole works before he left or Australia. Furthermore, his fixed focus did not, even for a moment, veer from the question of a good father’s duty – which he is fully conscious he himself would have to assume about 30 years hence – that is, to pick up the tab for all these relaxed ambience where even the mosquitoes have deserted us.
Now, let me make some observations about Michael’s Adelene, the chosen one. Michael first met Adelene during my first tour of duty as a judge in Penang (for 4 ½ years) when he was in Form 3 at St. Xavier’s Institution. Three months before he was due to sit for his SPM exam, I was transferred (of course not at my request) to Kangar, Perlis. Michael had, though under protest, to follow us yet he kept in constant contact with Adelene. After 2 years 10 months I was transferred to Alor Star, Kedah where I served for 2 more years before I was persuaded by Y. Bhg. Tun Mohamad Dzaiddin to move down to Kuala Lumpur to head the Commercial Division. I must say that it turned out to be a privilege to serve Perlis and Kedah. It is of interest to note that good judges like Y. Bhg. Dato’ K.C. Vohrah, YA Dato’ Hishamuddin, YAA Dato’ Alauddin, YA Dato’ Ariffin Zakaria and even the late Tun Suffian have served in Alor Star.
Alor Star was then an attractive town to be transferred to – perhaps attractive to the transferor rather than the transferees, if I could use the such a term. Of course, if we are short of words we could always say “correct, correct, correct, correct”. All the years that I was in Kangar, Alor Star and Kuala Lumpur, Michael still kept in close contact with Adelene. My wife and I often wondered why their relationship was on such abiding and firm footing. His attention and focus was never, even for a moment, averted to any other girl. I couldn’t appreciate the reason why this was so until we got to really know Adelene, after a few years. Clearly, the reason is that Michael’s girl is so much like his mother, in character and disposition. Of course it is my hope that Adelene has chosen Michael because he so much like his father, but that would be presumptuous of me. Well, as many have said: “Michael is a chip of the old block”. If you know my character, need I say more?
Young single women today faced a serious problem when it comes to finding a prospective husband, due to the following observations. It has been said that “Fifty per cent of all available men are married or spoken for. Another 30 per cent are gay and a further 10 per cent are jerks. This would mean that single women have so little choice as they are running around trying to attract only 10 per cent of men”. You may, through your own observation, assign your own percentages to the above, but the gist of this observation is not wholly baseless. Then, there is also this audacious but humorous comment by a wit as to why ladies today are still single: “Nice men are ugly; handsome men are not nice; handsome and nice men are gay; handsome, nice and heterosexual men are married; men who are not so handsome, but are nice men, have no money; men who are not so handsome, but are nice men with money, think women are only after their money; handsome men without money are after women’s money; handsome men, who are not so nice and somewhat heterosexual, don’t think women are beautiful enough; men that are heterosexual, somewhat nice and have money and who think women are beautiful, are cowards; men who are somewhat handsome, somewhat nice and have some money and thank god are heterosexual, are shy and NEVER MAKE THE FIRST MOVE!!!; men who never make the first move, automatically lose interest in women when they take the initiative. Now, who the hell understands men?”. So, having carefully observed and tested the character of Michael and Adelene, I am convinced that they are indeed within the lucky 10 per cent in their mutual choice.
Let us consider the institution of marriage, of which much have been said and advised. Cyril Connally says that: “The particular charm of marriage is the duologue, the permanent conversation between two people who talk over everything and everyone. A happy marriage is a long conversation that always seems too short”. Don Fraser and Doug Larson have opined that: “A happy home is one in which each spouse grants the possibility that the other may be right, though neither believes it” and “More marriages survive if the partners realized that sometimes the better comes after the worse.” On the other hand let me now quote the famous centenarian Mr. George Burns who declared: “Lots pf people have asked me what Gracie and I did to make our marriage work. It’s simple – we didn’t do anything. I think the trouble with a lot of people is that they work too hard at staying married. They make a business out of it. When you work too hard at a business you get tired; and when you get tired you get grouchy; and when you get grouchy you start fighting; and when you start fighting you’re out of business.” This man lived to 101 years old. I don’t believe him, so I won’t live to a hundred – perhaps only long enough to write my memoirs. But he is a comedian who would think you are crazy if you believe him. Then, there is one Mr. Ogden Nash who wrote that: “To keep your marriage brimming with love in a loving cup, whenever you’re wrong admit it; whenever you are right shut up”. Well, if you agree with his last advice, don’t marry a good judge, for he will never shut up if he thinks he is right.
To all those who have irretrievably tied the knot my advice is to be fair and gracious to each other and think positively. And, to all those who intend to commit themselves to a marriage partnership, do chose a spouse with the right genes. Here you have a choice, unlike what I have said about how to be a good judge: “it is easy, just have the right genes”. The following excerpts from my address to the Perak Barristers of the Inns of Court, London at a dinner in Syuen Hotel, Ipoh on 16th February 2001 (see (2001)2MLJ pg.xxxvii), could bear recall:
“In this critical periods of judicial history, what, you may wish to ask, are the essential qualities of a judge? In my opinion, when considering a candidate for this high office, which exclusively involves the dispensation of (and not dispensing with) justice, the qualities to look for are in the following order of priority: (i) intellectual honesty with unquestionable probity and integrity; (ii) analytical prowess; (iii) industry and a good command of language; (iv) knowledge of the law; (v) judicial temperament; and (vi) a keen awareness of the prevailing milieu or conditions in the society in which he or she functions. The first two qualities are innate, and the rest may be acquired. In this regard, I wholly support the Bar’s view that in order to ensure objectivity in the evaluation of a potential candidate’s suitability for appointment as Judicial Commissioners, or for confirmation and promotion of judges, he or she should first be vetted by a worthy and credible selection board” (now taken to mean a Judicial Appointments Commission).
We certainly have in our midst good judges who, for the sake of this beloved nation, would inexorably march to their personal calamity in answer to the call of their immutable genes.
It is an incontrovertible truism that every act of integrity, compassion, unflinching courage and sacrifice demonstrated to our children would encourage them to emulate our example. What will matter is how long we will be remembered, by whom and for what, and whether our children will be proud to declare the name of their father. Live so that when your children think of fairness and integrity they think of you. A further observation in that, couples who are happily married have learnt to live with their spouse with tolerance, even though their patience might wear thin at times. They have accepted each other’s faults and are willing to compromise. Life brings unpredictable circumstances; happiness, sadness, success, disappointments and failure – all these are part of sharing a life together. You do not need to love your in-laws if they are unlovable, but your relationship with them must always be fair and correct. It is wise to always bear in mind that your spouse and children are watching you - silently.
As there are many good judges here, sitting or retired, who grace this occasion, I must take this opportunity to venture this comment. The judiciary has been criticized by members of the public at most functions, even our friends and secretaries tell us so. But let me say this : our only shield against such lambasting is to administer justice with good conscience as reflected in our written judgments. I must congratulate those judges who have written such good, honest-to-God judgments. It is perhaps appropriate to quote what Julian Huxley has to say about the eternal permanency of the written word: “By speech first, but far more by writing, man has been able to put something of himself beyond death. In tradition and in books an integral part of the individual persists, for it can influence the minds and action of other people in different places and at different times: a row of black marks on a page can move a man to tears, though the bones of him that wrote it are long ago crumbled to dust”. Since this is true, it would thus follow that our children and grand children would have to live with the good or the bad that is reflected in our written judgments. We do not write to please anyone but only the Judge of History and the Judge of Conscience. It is now obvious to the wise and perceptive that we are inhabitants of a globalised world governed by the dictates of an IT driven cyberspace, where there is hardly any shelter for the corrupt. The above quotation by Julian Huxley was crafted in very potent language. So also was the following words of the late Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., a great orator, that will ring in my ears until I draw my last breath: “I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the colour of their skin but by the content of their character.”
Indeed, I believe that our beloved nation would never be one nation until the majority of its citizens abide by Rev. Martin Luther King’s dream. Now, in the context of the institution of marriage, I would add that it is the character of your spouse that will determine the fullness of the content of your happiness. It is good to have a way with words, like Martin Luther and Julian Huxley. It is not so good to have a way with women, because your good wife would not be happy and you may be accused of being a womanizer or a dead wood, hence not promoted; of course, the real reason may perhaps be that you do not have a way with men.
Lots of advice to the married couple from me, but I have a wish. My wish is that, at the end of a long and fruitful day in their lives together, my son could hold the same sentiments of his wife as I do of my beloved – of whom I have this to say, and I say it now before all of you. Providence has indeed endowed me with the perpetual freshness of her extrinsic beauty and more importantly, the beauty of her intrinsic character. She is totally incapable of any rancour or spite to anyone, while generous to a fault with her abiding love for me and the children. Certain kinks in the character of most men are often only tempered by the sensitive tact of a perceptive wife. Talking about irascible men, yet I may be genetically programmed to excel such men on this score at times. Many husbands think that their good wives are skillful only on the mundane irrelevant things in life. Little do they realize that it is precisely the mundane features of life such as the emotional support derived from wifely companionship through fair and foul weather, that is not only relevant in this turbulent world, but would keep their husbands on even keel. Yet if, upon reflections during interludes of quietude, a husband could appreciate this salutary feature of his relationship, his marriage would develop into a blissful tryst with destiny. I am indeed fortunate not to have to look elsewhere for love or solace, being ever so grateful to God for this masterpiece of His creation, that has so fortuitously come my way, to walk with me, hand in hand, in my sole and solitary journey through this Earth.
I must thank my honoured guests who have so graciously taken time off to be present here tonight to grace the occasion. The invitation was perforce, extended to only such a limited number of our friends. This is a truly small party where all of you have clearly reciprocated so graciously to my hand of friendship by being here tonight, mindful that some of my invitees could not be present due to the sacred call of duty to perform the Haj. This is what I would call the strength of significance in small numbers. My sincere thanks to all of you here tonight.

Rule by Law Killed the Rule of Law

News and Events June 16th, 2008
Has Rule by Law Killed the rule of Law in Malaysia?

Professor Ratna Rueban Balasubramaniam will be presenting his paper “Has Rule by Law Killed the Rule of Law in Malaysia?” on July 23, 2008, to the Faculty of Law at the National University of Singapore.

The writer considers "the use of the legal form as a cloak for arbitrary power, creates a serious problem of domination that can undermine the law-like character of legal order as a framework of norms that should facilitate the interests of legal subjects".

He refers to the decision by Malaysia’s highest court, the Federal Court, in Public, Prosecutor v. Kok Wah Kuan, where the majority rejected the separation of powers as an ‘integral’ feature of the constitutional order while the sole dissenting judge defended the principle as fundamental to democracy and the rule of law.


http://www2.carleton.ca/law/has-rule-by-law-killed-the-rule-of-law-in-malaysia/

This decision is reproduced hereinbelow for your reading. Please feel free to refer to the conclusion where the judge states "But as judges we have to apply the law as it exists. We simply have no choice whatever in the matter." and work backwords from this.




DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA (BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN JENAYAH NO. W – 05 – 69 – 2003ANTARA KOK WAH KUAN … PERAYU DAN PENDAKWA RAYA … RESPONDEN (Daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Kuala Lumpur Perbicaraan Jenayah Bil. 45-27-2002) Coram: Gopal Sri Ram, J.C.A. Zulkefli bin Ahmad Makinudin, J.C.A. Raus Sharif, J.C.A. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT1. The appellant before us was convicted of the offence ofmurder under section 302 of the Penal Code alleged to have been committed on 30 May 2002 in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur. He was then 12 years and 9 months old. His conviction was entered on 1 July 2003 and he was ordered to be detained during the pleasure of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong pursuant tosection 97(2) of the Child Act 2001. Section 97 reads as follows: “(1) A sentence of death shall not be pronounced or recorded against a person convicted of an offence if it appears to the Court that at the time when the offence was committed he was a child.

In lieu of a sentence of death, the Court shallorder a person convicted of an offence to be detained in a prison during the pleasure of – (a) the Yang di-Pertuan Agong if the offence was committed in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur or the Federal Territory of Labuan; or (b) the Ruler or the Yang di-Pertua Negeri, if the offence was committed in the State. (3) If the Court makes an order under subsection (2) that person shall, notwithstanding anything in this Act— (a) be liable to be detained in such prisonand under such conditions as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Ruler or the Yang di-Pertua Negeri may direct; and (b) while so detained, be deemed to be in lawful custody. (4) If a person is ordered to be detained at a prison under subsection (2), the Board of Visiting Justices for that prison

3(a) shall review that person's case at leastonce a year; and (b) may recommend to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Ruler or the Yang di-Pertua Negeri on the early release or further detention of that person and the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Ruler orthe Yang di-Pertua Negeri may thereupon order him to be released or furtherdetained, as the case may be.” 2. The appellant now argues that section 97 is ultra vires theFederal Constitution in that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers housed in the supreme law. The argument is that the power to impose punishment in a criminal case is a judicial power.What section 97 does, according to learned counsel for the appellant, is to vest this judicial power of punishment in the Executive arm of the Federation. Two issues therefore arise out of the appellant’s complaint. First, whether the doctrine of separation of powers is an integral part of the Constitution: second, whether section 97 in pith and substance violates that doctrine. 3. Prior to 10 June 1988, Article 121 of the Constitution opened with the words “the judicial power of the Federation shall be vested”. This phrase was taken by the framers of our Constitution from section 71 of the Australian Constitution. It was interpreted by Griffith C.J. in Huddart, Parker and Co Proprietary Ltd v Moorehead (1908–1909) 8 CLR 330, to mean “…the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and itssubjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise of this power does not begin until some tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision … iscalled upon to take action.” This definition was cited with approval by the Privy Council in Shell Co of Australia Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation[1931] AC 275.4. However, by Act A704, Article 121 was amended with effect from 10 June 1988 and the expression “judicial power” was deleted. No challenge as to the constitutionality of Act A704 was ever taken before any court. To our minds such a challenge, even if taken, would have failed because the amendment did not have the effect of divesting the courts of the judicial power of the Federation. There are two reasons for this. First, the amendingAct did nothing to vest the judicial power in some arm of the Federation other than the courts. Neither did it provide for the sharing of the judicial power with the Executive or Parliament or both those arms of Government. Second, the marginal note to Article 121 was not amended. This clearly expresses the intention of Parliament not to divest the ordinary courts of the judicial power of the Federation and to transfer it to or share it with either the Executive or the Legislature. 5. Now, marginal notes are admissible guides to statutory interpretation. Indeed – “It is now well settled that a marginal note is a part of the section. It is the key to open the mind of the legislature by affording guidance in understanding their intendment.” See, TheFilm Exhibitors Guild v State AIR 1987 AP 110, per K Ramaswamy J on behalf of the Full Bench. Of course, guidelines for statutory interpretation should not be applied when interpreting a Constitution. See, Hinds v The Queen [1976] 1 All ER 353, per Lord Diplock. But, a marginalnote in a written Constitution is nevertheless part of the supreme law and “furnishes some clue as to the meaning and purpose of the Article”. See, Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd v State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 661, per Das, Ag CJ at para. 24. In Sugumar Balakrishnan v Pengarah Imigresen Negeri Sabah & Anor [1998] 3 MLJ 289, this Court said: “The Constitution of Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) does not even mention the expressionjudicial power. Yet, upon high authority it hasbeen held that despite the omission, the provisions in that document: ‘… manifest an intention to secure in the judiciary a freedom from political,legislative and executive control. They are wholly appropriate in a Constitution which intends that judicial power shall be vested only in the judicature. They would be inappropriate in a Constitution by which it was intended that judicial power should be shared by the executive or the legislature. The Constitution’s silence as to the vesting of judicial power is consistent with its remaining, where it had lain for more than a century, in thehands of the judicature. It is not consistent with any intention that henceforth it should pass to or be shared by, the executive or the legislature (perLord Pearce in Liyanage v The Queen[1967] 1 AC 259 at p 287).’The Indian Constitution also does not make mention of judicial power being vested in thejudiciary. Yet, the same position obtains there as in Sri Lanka. See Minerva Mills Ltd v Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789. Like the Constitutions of Sri Lanka and India, the Federal Constitution preserves the separation of powers between the three arms of Government and evinces no intention that the judicial power ofthe Federation shall be passed to or shared with the Executive or the Legislature. It follows thatthe judicial power of the Federation remainswhere it has always been, namely, with the judiciary.” That is a view to which we still adhere. 7. In Hinds v The Queen, Lord Diplock made two observations that are applicable to the case at hand. In the first place he said ofthe Jamaican Constitution that – “It is taken for granted that the basic principle of separation of powers will apply to the exercise of their respective functions by these three organsof government.” He then made this further observation:“What, however, is implicit in the very structure of a Constitution on the Westminster model is that judicial power, however it be distributed from time to time between various courts, is to continue to be vested in persons appointed to hold judicial office in the manner and on the terms laid down in the Chapter dealing with the judicature, even though this is not expressly stated in the Constitution: Liyanage v The Queen[1967] 1 AC 259, 287-288.” 8. Based on the foregoing discussion, it is in our judgment beyond argument that the doctrine of separation of powers is very much an integral part of the Federal Constitution. Since Article 4(1) declares the Constitution to be the supreme law, it follows that any State action that violates the doctrine of separation of powers must be struck down as unconstitutional. And that brings us to the second issue that has fallen for determination. 9. In support of his argument that section 97(2) violates the doctrine of separation of powers between the Executive and theJudiciary, learned counsel for the appellant relied on Director ofPublic Prosecutions v Mollison [2003] UKPC 6. The facts ofthat case were these. The accused, Mollison was convicted of the murder one Leila Brown during a robbery, an offence which, by the law of Jamaica carried the death penalty. However, as Mollison was 19 years at the date of his conviction the trial judge, acting under section 29(1) of the Juveniles Act 1951 of Jamaica,ordered detention during the Governor-General’s pleasure. Subsections (1) and (4) of that section provided as follows: “(1) Sentence of death shall not be pronounced on or recorded against a person convicted of an offence if it appears to the Court that at the time when the offence was committed he was under the age of eighteen years, but in place thereof the court shall sentence him to be detained duringHer Majesty’s pleasure, and, if so sentenced, he shall, notwithstanding anything in the otherprovisions of this Law, be liable to be detained in such place (including, save in the case of a child, an adult correctional centre) and under such conditions as the Minister may direct, and while so detained shall be deemed to be in legal custody. (4) The Governor-General may release on licence any person detained under subsection (1) or (3) of this section. Such licence shall be in such form and contain such conditions as the Governor-General may direct, and may at any time be revoked or varied by the Governor-General. Where such licence is revoked the person to whom it relates shall return forthwith to such place as the Governor-General maydirect, and if he fails to do so may be arrested by any constable without warrant and taken to such place.” 10. Mollison argued that section 29 was incompatible with the separation of judicial from executive power which he said was afundamental principle upon which the Constitution of Jamaica was built. The argument found favour with the Privy Council. Lord Bingham of Cornhill who delivered the advice of the Board after having initially considered the accused’s submission on the point ambitious nevertheless treated it as having already been settled by the Board’s decision in Hinds. He also made the following observation of section 29 which, in our judgment, is the fulcrum upon which the case turned: “It is also a key feature of this sentence inJamaica (although no longer in the United Kingdom) that the decision on release is entrusted to the Governor-General as a memberof the executive. Section 29(4) of the Juveniles Act as amended has that express effect. This feature also has been clearly recognised: see The State v O’Brien [1973] IR 50 at 59-60, 64, 71-72; R v Secretary of State, Ex p Venables [1998] AC 407 at 498-499, 519-524, 530-532; Browne v the Queen [2000] 1 AC 45 at 48; V v United Kingdom (1999) 30 EHRR 121, paras 110-111. Thus while, in a case falling within section 29(1), the judge sitting in court passes sentence, it falls to the executive to determine the measure of punishment which an individual detainee will undergo: Hinds v The Queen [1977] AC 195 at227-228. It is clear that such determination is for all legal and practical purposes a sentencing exercise: see R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 3 WLR 1800, pp 1812, 1822-1823, 1830, [2002] UKHL 46, paras 24, 52, 74 and the authorities there cited.” 11. Two points emerge from the above-quoted passage. First, the power to pass sentence and the power to determine the measure of punishment are both part of the judicial power. Second, that section 29 consigned the latter power to the Executive. We may add that our courts have already held that the sentencing power is a judicial power. Thus in Public Prosecutor v Dato’ Yap Peng [1987] 2 MLJ 311, Zakaria Yatim J (whose decision was upheld by the Supreme Court) said: “In the context of criminal law, the Court possesses the judicial power to try a person foran offence committed by him and to pass sentence against him if he is found guilty.” 12. Now, look at section 97(2). It is clear from its plain readingthat Parliament has consigned the power to determine the measure of the sentence that is to be served to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in the case of an offence committed in any of the Federal Territories and to the Ruler or Governor in the case of the severalStates of the Federation. By Article 39 of our Constitution, the executive authority of the Federation is vested in the Yang di Pertuan Agong. Save on certain matters that are not in issue here, the Yang di Pertuan Agong is a constitutional monarch and must, in accordance with Article 40(1), act in accordance with the advice given him by the Cabinet or a particular Minister of the Cabinet.
Thus – “when one finds in the Constitution itself or in a Federal law powers conferred upon the Yang di-Pertuan Agong that are expressed to be exercisable if he is of opinion or is satisfied that a particular state of affair exists or that particularaction is necessary, the reference to his opinion or satisfaction is in reality a reference to the collective opinion or satisfaction of the members of the Cabinet, or the opinion or satisfaction of a particular Minister to whom the Cabinet have delegated their authority to give advice upon the matter in question”, per Lord Diplock in Teh Cheng Poh v Public Prosecutor [1979] 1 MLJ 50. 13. In our judgment, applying settled principles, section 97(2) clearly contravenes the doctrine of separation of powers housed in the Constitution by consigning to the Executive the judicial power to determine the measure of the sentence that is to be served by the instant appellant. Section 97(4) does not, in our considered judgment, rescue the second subsection from unconstitutionality. If anything it compounds the problem. For, that subsection doesin fact confirm that it is the Yang di Pertuan Agong who
determines the measure of the sentence that is to be served, save that it is a power that is exercised on the advice of a Board ofVisiting Justices. Hence section 97(4) is merely a procedural adjunct to the principal power to determine the measure of the sentence that the appellant is to serve. 14. There are two short matters that need to be dealt with beforewe conclude. First, it was pointed out during argument that there may be other statutes, e.g., section 348 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which make provision for the detention of persons at the pleasure of the Yang di Pertuan Agong, or a Ruler or Governor. It was said that striking down section 97(2) may affect those otherprovisions. With respect, we do not agree. As was pointed out by the Indian Supreme Court in In re the Special Courts Bill, 1978 AIR 1979 SC 478, the constitutionality of a particular provision must be determined in each case as it arises. Our conclusion that section 97(2) is inconsistent with the Constitution does not extend to a declaration of unconstitutionality of other equipollent provisions. The validity of these other provisionsmust be dealt with on a case by case basis as and when the occasion arises. In the specific case of section 348 of the CriminalProcedure Code, it is a pre-Merdeka and hence a pre-Constitution provision. It must therefore be dealt with in accordance with the principles set out in Assa Singh v Menteri Besar, Johore [1969] 152 MLJ 30 which were applied by this Court in Kerajaan Negeri Selangor v Saggong Tasi [2005] 4 CLJ 169. In the case of pre-Merdeka statutes, the courts are empowered to “apply the existing law with such modifications as may be necessary to bring it into accord with the Constitution”: Surinder Singh Kanda v The Federation of Malaya [1962] MLJ 169, per Lord Denning). Wedo not have such a power in respect of laws enacted post-Merdeka. In respect of such laws, the only power we have, under Article 4(1) of the Constitution is to either uphold them as being intra vires the supreme law or strike them down as being inconsistent with it. Consequently, once a law is found to violate the Constitution the court has no choice but to declare it void and of no effect. So much for the constitutional ground. 15. The other point in the case is this. Learned counsel for the appellant when opening his argument said that quite apart from the constitutional argument, there were other grounds in the petition of appeal which he said he would leave on file. This, of course, required the learned deputy who responded to the appeal to argue the merits of the appeal. We must say at once that this was a gruesome murder and that there is abundant material on record to support the conviction of the appellant. The victim in this case was found to have had 20 stab wounds. This clearly points to an intention to kill. There is absolutely no evidence to bring the case within one of exceptions. The learned trial judge admirably dealt with the evidence and drew the proper inferences from it. In our judgment the conviction is therefore entirely safe. 16. What is to be the upshot? This is a case in which Parliament has provided for the entry of a conviction and passing of sentence but has made no valid law for the measure of sentence. A similar situation arose in Soon Kim Seng v Public Prosecutor [1978] 2 MLJ 107. There, the accused was convicted on 3 charges of having in his possession contrivances capable of being used for the purposes of making infringing copies of textbooks the copyrightsof which were vested in the complainant. He was sentenced to a fine of $1,500 on each of the 3 charges. He appealed on the ground that the legislation had not provided for any fine orpunishment for the possession of a duplicating contrivance. Chang Min Tat J, in allowing the appeal held, with regret, thatParliament had failed to provide a punishment for the offence in question. He accordingly upheld the conviction but set aside the sentence. We must with like regret follow suit. Here, Parliament has said that the appellant shall not, by reason of his age, receive the capital punishment but has made no valid law conferring power upon the courts to impose some other sentence. We would have been inclined to impose life imprisonment in this case but unfortunately our written law does not contain any equipollent provision that exists under Jamaican law. 17. For the reasons already given the appeal against conviction isdismissed. However, the sentence passed is set aside. We will now hear arguments on the consequential orders that we should make on this appeal. 18. In conclusion we must say that this is a tragic case. Liyangeand Hinds have been in the law reports since 1967 and 1976 respectively. Both have been applied by our courts long before the Child Act was drafted. It is unfortunate that those charged with the drafting of the Child Act did not pay proper attention to the decided cases. If they had done so, the incongruent and unfortunate circumstances now before this Court may well have been avoided. But as judges we have to apply the law as it exists. We simply have no choice whatever in the matter. Dated this 12th day of July 2007. Gopal Sri Ram Judge, Court of Appeal Malaysia Counsel for the appellant: Karpal Singh (Ramkarpal Singhwith him) Solicitors for the appellant: Tetuan Karpal Singh & Co. Counsel for the respondent: Yaacob Sam (Mangai with him) Solicitors for the respondent: Peguam Negara Malaysia.

The Rule of Law

World's top legal experts unveil 'rule of law' index aimed at measuring how nations behave ... The Associated Press What is the the rule of law? The concept can be traced from in Plato’s, Statesman & Law and Aristotle’s Politic but simply put by AV Dicey; supremacy of law in contrast to arbitrary power, equality before the law for all classes in ordinary courts and the law of the constitution. He said this in In his treatise, Law of the Constitution. Respectfully, it is a “CONCEPT” and not part of an “equation”. Yes, the Rule of Law is not a rule after all. Forgive me, for all those who are going to banter with me on this one. However in over quest to rationalise all, an equation (or several of them) have surfaced to give us an indication “who’s been naughty and who’s been good” (pun intended) Refer to Earthtrends http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/environmental-governance/variable-1280.html We have Kaufmann’s Rule of Law Index. http://humandevelopment.bu.edu/dev_indicators/show_info.cfm?index_id=121&data_type=1 We even have a map http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Maprl.png#file Just to conclude with something from Thomas Paine's Common Sense "For as in absolute governments the king is law, so in free countries the law ought to be king; and there ought to be no other." Link this up do the decision in Public Prosecutor v. Kok Wah Kuan which has been reproduced in this blog at the conclusion where the judge states "But as judges we have to apply the law as it exists. We simply have no choice whatever in the matter." and you have a starting point on the rule of law.

You are Special

"There has never been another you.

With no effort on your part you were born to be something very special and set apart.

What you are going to do in appreciation of that gift is a decision only you can make."

Dan Zadra

Idioms - Law

Bandit territory
An area or an industry, profession, etc, where rules and laws are ignored or flouted is bandit territory.
Barrack-room lawyer
(UK) A barrack-room lawyer is a person who gives opinions on things they are not qualified to speak about.
Kangaroo court
When people take the law into their own hands and form courts that are not legal, these are known as kangaroo court.
Law unto yourself
If somebody's a law unto themselves, they do what they believe is right regardless of what is generally accepted as correct.
Lay down the law If someone lays down the law, they tell people what to do and are authoritarian.
Letter of the law
If people interpret laws and regulations strictly, ignoring the ideas behind them, they follow the letter of the law.
Sod's law I always thought it was Murphy's Law
Sod's law states that if something can go wrong then it will.
Spirit of the law The spirit of the law is the idea or ideas that the people who made the law wanted to have effect.

Pulau Besar ("Big Island"), Melaka

Off the Coast of the Historical City of Melaka, there is an island known as Pulau Besar which is of immense historical significance.

At Lot 840 there is a holy tomb of Shaikh Ismail ibn ‘Abd al-Qadir ibn ‘Abd al-Jabbar ibn Salih ibn ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani, qaddasallahu sirrah (r.a.), also known as Sultan Al-Arifin Syeikh Ismail (the “Holy Tomb”). Sultan Arifin was accorded the title of “Wali”/Saint.

Pulau Besar also surfaces in Ming Dynasty record as “Wu-Shu” and used as landmarks in the emperor’s voyages.

It is estimated that this Holy Tomb is over 700 years old. Together with this Holy Tomb is the tomb of Sharifah Rodziah and his teacher, Sheikh Yusuf as-Siddiq. Sultan Arifin who is said to be the 4th generation descendant of the infamous Sufi grandmaster Sheikh Abdul Qadir al-Jilani, the guide the Muslim population of Samudera, the Peninsular and the Malay Archipelago. It is said that many embraced Islam through the grandmasters’ guidance.


Nevertheless, the Holy Tomb is visited by countless numbers of visitors sans race, religion and cultural background;

Visitors to the Holy Tomb include visitors from all other countries including Singapore, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, etc. There is also an influx of Muslim visitors to the Holy Tomb. During the Muslim celebrations of Maulud Rasul, visitors to the Holy Tomb exceed tens of thousands. This is during the months of Rabiul Awal and Rabiul Akhir (twice) where many visitors attend the Holy Tomb;


The Holy Tomb has been managed over the 700 years or so by its caretakers who have handed down these responsibilities from one generation to another.

Nearing the Holy Tomb is another historical site – the Makam Tujuh Adik-Beradik, tomb/shrine of the seven princesses. The seven princesses from India who while on a visited to Pulau Besar were struck down by illness and died. They were buried on the island and their graves marked with the shrine.

In 1991, the various significant structures at Lot 840 and PT No.10 including the Holy Tomb were demolished by the Defendants/Jabatan Agama Islam Melaka and/or their agents. Further the said Makam Tujuh Adik-Beradik was “transferred” to Lot 840.

Coincidentally, a few days later the largest dam in the state called Empangan Durian Runtuh suddenly “dried-up”. Where did the water go? The state of Malacca underwent difficult times for almost a year.

Further, there are regulated rules of conduct to be observed on the Island. Alcohol nor pork ought NOT to be brought onto the Island. Many boats are said to have capsized as a consequence. Dressing codes and rude and immoral conduct of her visitors have also been equally “punished”. …. Truth or fiction?

The Holy Tomb and the other structures were restored and reconstructed in 1999.

It is said that vows & boons are prayed for and received here making Pulau Besar somewhat special to its visitors. Whatsoever their wish, it is undisputed that its cultural and historical heritage of primary significant.