Kepercayaan kepada Tuhan, Melaka's Pulau Besar & Maulud

Maulud Celebrations at Pulau Besar being hampered...   its a public event with ALL RACES attending a customary event ..... ... sad state of Affairs when when our 1st Rukunegara is violated .... Why are the gates to closed ....

http://doctrine-res-ipsa-loquitur.blogspot.com/2008/07/pulau-besar-big-island-melaka.html

At Lot 840 there is a holy tomb of Shaikh Ismail ibn ‘Abd al-Qadir ibn ‘Abd al-Jabbar ibn Salih ibn ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani, qaddasallahu sirrah (r.a.), also known as Sultan Al-Arifin Syeikh Ismail (the “Holy Tomb”). Sultan Arifin was accorded the title of “Wali”/Saint.  Pulau Besar also surfaces in Ming Dynasty record as “Wu-Shu” and used as landmarks in the emperor’s voyages.

It is estimated that this Holy Tomb is over 700 years old. Together with this Holy Tomb is the tomb of Sharifah Rodziah and his teacher, Sheikh Yusuf as-Siddiq. Sultan Arifin who is said to be the 4th generation descendant of the infamous Sufi grandmaster Sheikh Abdul Qadir al-Jilani, the guide the Muslim population of Samudera, the Peninsular and the Malay Archipelago. It is said that many embraced Islam through the grandmasters’ guidance. 

Nevertheless, the Holy Tomb is visited by countless numbers of visitors sans race, religion and cultural background;
Visitors to the Holy Tomb include visitors from all other countries including Singapore, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, etc. There is also an influx of Muslim visitors to the Holy Tomb. During the Muslim celebrations of Maulud Rasul, visitors to the Holy Tomb exceed tens of thousands. This is during the months of Rabiul Awal and Rabiul Akhir (twice) where many visitors attend the Holy Tomb;


The Holy Tomb has been managed over the 700 years or so by its caretakers who have handed down these responsibilities from one generation to another. 

Companies are separate legal entities unless its veil can be pierced

Adams and others v Cape Industries plc and another [1991] 1 All ER 929 the single economic unit argument. 

Slade L.J. 

“The ‘single economic unit’ argument

There is no general principle that all companies in a group of companies are to be regarded as one. On the contrary, the fundamental principle is that ‘each company in a group of companies (a relatively modern concept) is a separate legal entity possessed of separate legal rights and liabilities’: The Albazero [1975] 3 All ER 21 at 28, [1977] AC 774 at 807 per Roskill LJ.12

It is thus indisputable that each of Cape, Capasco, NAAC and CPC were in law separate legal entities. Mr Morison did not go so far as to submit that the very fact of the parent-subsidiary relationship existing between Cape and NAAC rendered Cape or Capasco present in Illinois. Nevertheless, he submitted that the court will, in appropriate circumstances, ignore the distinction in law between members of a group of companies treating them as one, and that broadly speaking, it will do so whenever it considers that justice so demands. In support of this submission, he referred us to a number of authorities.”

“Mr Morison described the theme of all these cases as being that where legal technicalities would produce injustice in cases involving members of a group of companies, such technicalities should not be allowed to prevail. We do not think that the cases relied on go nearly so far as this. As Sir Godfray Le Quesne submitted, save in cases which turn on the wording of particular statutes or contracts, the court is not free to disregard the principle of Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, [1895—9] All ER Rep 33 merely because it considers that justice so requires. Our law, for better or worse, recognises the creation of subsidiary companies, which though in one sense the creatures of their parent companies, will nevertheless under the general law fall to be treated as separate legal entities with all the rights and liabilities which would normally attach to separate legal entities.”

“In the light of the set-up and operations of the Cape group and of the relationship between Cape/Capasco and NAAC we see the attraction of the approach adopted by Lord Denning MR in the DHN case [1976] 3 All ER 462 at 467, [1976] 1 WLR 852 at 860 which Mr Morison urged us to adopt:

‘This group is virtually the same as a partnership in which all the three partners are companies.’

In our judgment, however, we have no discretion to reject the distinction between the members of the group as a technical point. We agree with Scott J that the observations of Robert Goff LJ in Bank of Tokyo Ltd v Karoon [1986] 3 All ER 468 at 486, [1987] AC 45 at 64 are apposite:

‘Counsel suggested beguilingly that it would be technical for us to distinguish between parent and subsidiary company in this context; economically, he said, they were one. But we are concerned not with economics but with law. The distinction between the two is, in law, fundamental and cannot here be bridged’.”

Finally, in regard to the lifting of the veil of incorporation, Slade L.J. approached it in this way (see page 1026 of the report):

“Whether or not such a course deserves moral approval, there was nothing illegal as such in Cape arranging its affairs (whether by the use of subsidiaries or otherwise) so as to attract the minimum publicity to its involvement in the sale of Cape asbestos in the United States. As to condition (iii), we do not accept as a matter of law that the court is entitled to lift the corporate veil as against a defendant company which is the member of a corporate group merely because the corporate structure has been used so as to ensure that the legal liability (if any) in respect of particular future activities of the group (and correspondingly the risk of enforcement of that liability) will fall on another member of the group rather than the defendant company. Whether or not this is desirable, the right to use a corporate structure in this manner is inherent in our corporate law. Mr Morison urged on us that the purpose of the operation was in substance that Cape would have the practical benefit of the group’s asbestos trade in the United States without the risks of tortious liability. This may be so. However, in our judgment, Cape was in law entitled to organise the group’s affairs in that manner and (save in the case of AMC to which special considerations apply) to expect that the court would apply the principle of Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, [1895-9] All ER Rep 33 in the ordinary way.”