Wednesday, July 30, 2008

The Gita

What are the two verses that serve as two banks of the river of life?

"sraddhâvân labhathe jnânam":
One who has steadfastness and sincerity can obtain wisdom.

"samsayâtmâ vinasyati":
One who doubts will come to ruin.

Wednesday, July 23, 2008

The Internal Security Act

Internal Security Act is the legislation that enable the government to preserve the internal security, amonst its power it authorizes the arrest and detention without trial for a duration.

Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 1949
"If the Occupying Power considers it necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned residence or to internment."

Consider Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
"makes clear that no-one should be subjected to arbitrary detention and that deprivation of liberty must be based on grounds and procedures established by law".

We have the 'Internal Security Act (Malaysia)', 'Internal Security Act (Singapore)', 'Internal Security Act (South Africa)' and in America. Subversive Activities Control Act, McCarran Act . some Sections (not all) of the Subversive Activities Control Act, McCarran Act has been since ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

In Israeli this legislation is known as Administrative detention, applied to equally Palestinianian and occasionally Jewish right-wing extremists. The period of Administrative Detention orders goes up to 6 months where there is a reasonable threat to the security of the state and can be extended


The Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA) Malaysia was inherited from Britain ,in essence, it allows for the arrest of any person without the need for trial in certain defined circumstances for over 2 years. Initially and primarily needed for communist insurgents.

Section 8(1) of the ISA provides detention where the minister is satisfied that any person has acted in any manner prejudicial to the;
a) security of Malaysia or part thereof;
b) maintenance of essential services;
c) economic life.
Section 8(7), allows renewal of this 2 year period, indefinately

Tuesday, July 22, 2008

A Mareva Injunction

A mareva injunction is an equitable relief but not as to preserve the status quo but as an aide to execution. It is a preventive relief to restrain the Defendant from dissipating assets (out of the jurisdiction). All that the Plaintiff is required to show is that:- They have a prima facie case; The Defendant has assets within the jurisdiction; There is a real risk of assets being dissipated before judgment. Order 29, Rules of The High Court, 1980 Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulkcarriers [1975] 2 Llyods Rep 509 Ninemia Maritime Corp v Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH; The Niedersachsen [1984] 1 All ER 398, on appeal [1984] 1 All ER 413 S&F International Ltd v Transcon Engineering Sdn Bhd [1985] 1 MLJ 62 Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad v Lorrain Osman [1985] 2 MLJ 236 Biasamas Sdn Bhd & Ors v Kan Yan Heng & Anor [1998] 4 MLJ 1 Good arguable case All that is required to show in a good arguable case is that, on the evidence available, there is a fair chance that the Plaintiff can obtain judgment. Ninemia Maritime Corp v Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH; The Niedersachsen [1984] 1 All ER 398, on appeal [1984] 1 All ER 413. There is no need to show a case so strong as to warrant summary judgment. Biasamas Sdn Bhd & Ors v Kan Yan Heng & Anor [1998] 4 MLJ 1 A Mareva injunction case obtained more speedily than a summary judgment which may preclude the applicant from enjoying the fruits of his judgment. Third Chandris Shipping Corporation v Unimarine SA [1979] 2 All ER 972

Thursday, July 17, 2008

DNA

Abstract

In a number of recent cases in the UK, convictions have been quashed by the Court of Appeal on the grounds that the jury had been misdirected as to the factual significance of random occurrence statistics. The mathematical basis on which those statistics are calculated was reviewed and recent appeal cases involving DNA evidence in the UK and the US were examined. It was found that a widespread misconception exists regarding the random occurrence ratio and its relationship with probability of guilt. It is in fact impossible to relate the two with any degree of accuracy without consideration of social and demographic factors particular to a case as well as any non-DNA evidence obtained.

http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0379073802001986

Also on complexity of evidence being out to a jury. (Malaysia has abolished jury trial long since)
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/publicat/judicature/article10.html

Carole McCartney

DNA evidence is a powerful investigative tool, able to incriminate as well as exculpate. Yet, increasingly common portrayals of DNA as being able to solve crimes almost instantaneously, beyond any doubt, even from ‘beyond the grave’, may overstate the degree to which DNA currently assists in criminal investigations. Strong government support, and financial investment in the DNA Expansion Programme, have been bolstered by repeated legislative extensions of police powers to obtain and retain DNA samples. Despite this, DNA evidence remains marginal in terms of assisting with overall criminal detections and experts now suggest that the massive National DNA Database expansion has not resulted in the improvement in detection rates originally anticipated. This paper also suggests potential concerns over the ‘tactical’ use of DNA evidence during suspect interviews, and the risk of abbreviated police investigations. Insufficiently ‘forensically aware’ police officers may resort to DNA evidence in lieu of proper detective work, with literature on ‘case construction’ informing analysis of potential pitfalls of early reliance on DNA results, which may increase the risk ‘tunnel vision’ in criminal investigations.

http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/46/2/175

more on DNA

The value of DNA evidence has to be seen in light of recent cases where criminals planted fake DNA samples at crime scenes. In one case, a criminal even planted fake DNA evidence in his own body: Dr. John Schneeberger of Canada raped one of his sedated patients in 1992 and left semen on her underwear. Police drew Schneeberger's blood and compared its DNA against the crime scene semen DNA on three occasions, never showing a match. It turned out that he had surgically inserted a Penrose drain into his arm and filled it with foreign blood and anticoagulants.(emphasis mine)

Evidence from an expert who has compared DNA samples must be accompanied by evidence as to the sources of the samples and the procedures for obtaining the DNA profiles. The judge must ensure that the jury must understand the significance of DNA matches and mismatches in the profiles. The judge must also ensure that the jury does not confuse the 'match probability' (the probability that a person that is chosen at random has a matching DNA profile to the sample from the scene) with the 'likelihood ratio' (the probability that a person with matching DNA committed the crime). In R v. Doheny, EWCA Crim 728 (1996). Phillips LJ gave this example of a summing up, which should be carefully tailored to the particular facts in each case:
Members of the Jury, if you accept the scientific evidence called by the Crown, this indicates that there are probably only four or five white males in the United Kingdom from whom that semen stain could have come. The Defendant is one of them. If that is the position, the decision you have to reach, on all the evidence, is whether you are sure that it was the Defendant who left that stain or whether it is possible that it was one of that other small group of men who share the same DNA characteristics.
Juries should weigh up conflicting and corroborative evidence, using their own common sense and not by using mathematical formulae, such as Bayes' theorem, so as to avoid "confusion, misunderstanding and misjudgment".

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNA_fingerprinting#Fake_DNA_evidence

Criminal Defamation, Malice and Public Figures

Defamation is a statement, written or oral (libel or slander respectively) which is published (to a 3rd party) to lower one’s self esteem in the estimation of the community/right thinking members of the society.

Criminal Defamation is where the state prosecutes the maker, unlike in civil cases where the victim sues the maker. Its origin’s and purpose was to predominantly defend “political leaders” or protect the smooth running of “stately functions”.

The criminalisation of defamation evinces the state’s/country’s interest in prosecuting such act, thus the penal slant to it. Such charges are rare because of the ever expansion of freedom of expression thoughts/laws in many countries.

In other words my right to say it outweighs your right to retrain me from doing so.

There are human rights organisation such as ARTICLE 19 with a specific mandate and focus on the defence and promotion of freedom of expression and freedom of information worldwide – “ We believe that all people have the right to freedom of expression and access to information, and that the full enjoyment of this right is the most potent force to achieve individual freedoms, strengthen democracy, and pre-empt repression, conflict, war and genocide”


But surely one’s right of expression cannot extend to publishing what is untrue, particularly in the case of public figures.

Thus, there is the defence of fair comment on a matter of public interest. In the American jurisdiction, its "equivalent" - the public figure doctrine.

Public Figures can rely on this protection. The test is simply one that acknowledges the presence or absence of malice. In the absence of malice such statements must be published knowing it to be false or with reckless disregard to its truth, i.e. the term “actual malice” - New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)


The primary Defence to Defamation is Justification in the British system or Truth in the American jurisdiction respectively.


Other defences of public interest are, firstly Privilege - Absolute and Qualified, the former cannot be sued on in its entirety (e.g. a judge’s judgement, dicta) even with the presence of malice and the latter, statements made furtherance to public interest or duty can only be sued if there is a malicious intent.

In English criminal law, mens rea , Latin for guilty mind, was considered in R v. Cunningham (1957) 2 AER 412

(1) an actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that in fact was done; or
(2) recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not (i.e. the accused has foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be done and yet has gone on to take the risk of it).

Thus, consider the element of intent in something done recklessly.

Therefore, if one makes a statement Recklessly, it could be said that such statement was made maliciously too. In this event, the Defence of Fair Comment, Privilege and Public Figure Doctrine must fail with the presence element of malice.

In Litigating, the element of Malice must be given its predominance.

Tuesday, July 8, 2008

the Rule of Law .. saved ?

reference is made to PP v. KOK WAH KUAN wherein an extract of the judgement is repruduced hereinbelow. The Federal Court composed of AHMAD FAIRUZ CJ, ABDUL HAMID MOHAMAD PCA, ALAUDDIN MOHD SHERIFF CJ (MALAYA), RICHARD MALANJUM CJ (SABAH & SARAWAK), ZAKI TUN AZMI FCJ.

some interesting points in the judgement

"Judges have wide discretion in determining when they apply and to what extent".


and then the learned judge proceeded with examples


1. Formulating original precedents

Life is larger than the law and there is no dearth of novel situations for which there is no enacted rule on point. In such situations a judge relies on the customs and traditions of the land and on standards, doctrines and principles of justice that are embedded in the life of the community to lay down an "original precedent" to assist the court. Admittedly, this fashioning of a new precedent is an infrequent occurrence but its impact on legal growth is considerable;

2. Overruling earlier precedents
Judicial creativity is fully in play when a previous precedent is overruled and thereby denied the authority of law. The overruling may be retrospective or prospective. In either case a new principle is contributed to the legal system and a new direction is forged;

3. Constitutional review
Under arts. 4(1) and 128 of the Federal Constitution, the Superior Courts of this country have the power to review the validity of legislative and executive actions by reference to norms of the basic law. If a legislative measure is found by the court to be unconstitutional, the court has a number of choices. It may condemn the entire statute as illegal or it may apply the doctrine of severability and invalidate only the sections that are unconstitutional and leave the rest of the statute intact. The court may declare the statute null and void ab-initio or only from the date of the ruling. For instance in Dato’ Yap Peng v. PP [1987] 2 MLJ 31 the Supreme Court invalidated s. 418A of the Criminal Procedure Code prospectively.
Questions of constitutionality are fraught with political and policy considerations and decisions thereon can influence the course of legal and political development. For example in Faridah Begum v. Sultan Ahmad Shah [1996] 2 CLJ 159 the majority held that the 1993 constitutional amendment removing the immunities of the Sultans cannot apply to suits brought by foreigners.
Article 162(6) of the Federal Constitution allows judges to modify pre-Merdeka laws in order to make such laws conform to the Constitution. Modification is without doubt a legislative task.

4. Statutory interpretation
In interpreting pre-existing law a judge is not performing a mere robotic function. The interpretive task is, by its very nature, so creative that it is indistinguishable from law-making. "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." (per the American jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes). This is specially so in constitutional law. Even if it is accepted that a judge is bound by the intention of the legislature, it must be noted that such an intention is not always clearly defined. The formal law is so full of ambiguities, gaps and conflicts that often a judge has to reach out beyond the statute to seek a solution to the problem at hand. (See: Chiu Wing Wa & Ors v. Ong Beng Cheng [1994] 1 CLJ 313). A judge may scrutinise preambles, headings and extraneous materials like explanatory statements that accompany Bills and parliamentary debates to help unravel the meaning of statutory formulae. A judge may lean on the interpretation clauses of a statute or on the Interpretation Act 1948/1967 to decipher the intention of the legislature. Or he may fall back on a wealth of rules of statutory construction to aid his task. So numerous and varied are these rules that judicial discretion to rely on one rule or another cannot be predicted. Sometimes a judge’s attention is drawn to foreign legislation and related precedents. He may declare the overseas statute to be in pari materia with local legislation and, therefore, relevant to the case. Alternatively, he may pronounce the local law to be sui generis and therefore to be viewed in the local context without aid of foreign decisions.
When the enacted law leads to undesirable or unjust results, a judge may be persuaded to add moral or public policy shades to the issue in order to do justice.
One could also note, for instance, the "public interest" interpretation of art. 5(3) of the Federal Constitution in Ooi Ah Phua v. Officer-In-Charge Criminal Investigation, Kedah/Perlis [1975] 1 LNS 117 in which the court held that the constitutional right to legal representation can be postponed pending police investigation. In Teoh Eng Huat v. Kadhi Pasir Mas [1990] 2 CLJ 11; [1990] 1 CLJ (Rep) 277 the "wider interest of the nation" prevailed over a minor’s right to religion guaranteed by art. 11. In Hajjah Halimatussaadiah v. Public Services Commission [1992] 1 CLJ 413; [1992] 2 CLJ (Rep) 467 the court subjected a public servant’s claim of a religious right to wear purdah at the workplace to the need to maintain "discipline in the service".
A judge is not required to view a statute in isolation. He is free to view the entire spectrum of the law in its entirety; to read one statute in the light of related statutes and relevant precedents; to understand law in the background of a wealth of presumptions, principles, doctrines and standards that operate in a democratic society. (See: Kesultanan Pahang v. Sathask Realty Sdn. Bhd. [1998] 2 CLJ 559). He is justified in giving effect to what is implicit in the legal system and to crystallize what is inherent. Such a holistic approach to legal practice is justified because "law" in art. 160(2) is defined broadly to include written law, common law and custom and usage having the force of law.

5. Operation of doctrine of binding precedent
The doctrine of binding judicial precedent exists to promote the principle of justice that like cases should be decided alike. It also seeks to ensure certainty, stability and predictability in the judicial process. There can be no denying that the existence of this doctrine imposes some rigidity in the law and limits judicial choices. But one must not ignore the fact that some flexibility and maneuverability still exist.
Though a superior court is generally reluctant to disregard its own precedents, it does have the power "to refuse to follow" its earlier decisions or to cite them with disapproval. Our Federal Court has, on some occasions, overruled itself. High Court judges occasionally refuse to follow other High Court decisions. An inferior court can maneuver around a binding decision through a host of indirect techniques.

6. Application of doctrine of ultra vires
Whether an agency has acted ultra vires is a complex question of law that permits judicial creativity.
Some statutes declare that discretion is absolute or that a decision is final and conclusive. Some statutory powers are conferred in broad and subjective terms. To statutory formulae of this sort, contrasting judicial responses are possible. The court may interpret them literally and give judicial sanction to absolute powers.
Alternatively the court may read into the enabling law implied limits and constitutional presumptions of a rule of law society. This will restrict the scope of otherwise unlimited powers. (See: R v. Lord Chancellor, Ex p Witham [1998] QB 575). Subjective powers may be viewed objectively. Purposive interpretation may be preferred over literal interpretation. (See: Public Prosecutor v. Sihabduin bin Haji Salleh & Anor [1981] CLJ 39; [1981] CLJ (Rep) 82).
When procedural violations are alleged, a decisive but discretionary issue is whether the procedure was mandatory or directory. Violation of a mandatory procedure results in nullity. Violation of a directory requirement is curable.

7. Import of rules of natural justice
Rules of natural justice are non-statutory standards of procedural fairness. They are not nicely cut up and dried and vary from situation to situation. Judges have wide discretion in determining when they apply and to what extent


Consider Public Prosecutor v. Kok Wah Kuan which has been reproduced in this blog "But as judges we have to apply the law as it exists. We simply have no choice whatever in the matter."

Sunday, July 6, 2008

Address by YA Dato' Vincent Ng Kim Khoay

For some of you that have inquired and whom I have spoken, the learned Judge's address is reproduced herein for your easy reading. It will be posted in my blog for a bit. Do be inspired.


Address by YA Dato' Vincent Ng Kim Khoay on marriage of his son, Mr. Michael Ng on 30 November 2007

Y.Bhg. Datin Hamidah Chong, the graceful representative of YAA Dato’ Abdul Hamid Haji Mohamad, President of Court of Appeal and Acting C.J., Puan Ambiga Sreevenasan, Chairman of the Malaysian Bar Council, my brothers and sisters at the Bench, my former brothers and sisters at law for over a score and six years, Tan Sri-Tan Sri, Dato’ Sri-Dato Sri, Dato’-Dato’, Datin-Datin and my very dear friends.
Surely, this auspicious occasion must concern the marriage couple and the societal institution of marriage. About the bridegroom: from the locale of tonight’s function you may have observed that my son Michael is an incorrigible environmentalist. He rejected air-conditioning and has chosen to make this public declaration of his union with his beloved wife in this wonderful romantic setting of green grass, natural fresh air, a hoped for starry skies, ivory coloured upholstery for the table and chairs placed before a cool water backdrop and all conjoined with soft lilting string instruments music. I thought I had guided Michael to focus and plan correctly. Little did I know that he could focus so well, so as to be in accord with the future trend of greening the Earth, and planed the whole works before he left or Australia. Furthermore, his fixed focus did not, even for a moment, veer from the question of a good father’s duty – which he is fully conscious he himself would have to assume about 30 years hence – that is, to pick up the tab for all these relaxed ambience where even the mosquitoes have deserted us.
Now, let me make some observations about Michael’s Adelene, the chosen one. Michael first met Adelene during my first tour of duty as a judge in Penang (for 4 ½ years) when he was in Form 3 at St. Xavier’s Institution. Three months before he was due to sit for his SPM exam, I was transferred (of course not at my request) to Kangar, Perlis. Michael had, though under protest, to follow us yet he kept in constant contact with Adelene. After 2 years 10 months I was transferred to Alor Star, Kedah where I served for 2 more years before I was persuaded by Y. Bhg. Tun Mohamad Dzaiddin to move down to Kuala Lumpur to head the Commercial Division. I must say that it turned out to be a privilege to serve Perlis and Kedah. It is of interest to note that good judges like Y. Bhg. Dato’ K.C. Vohrah, YA Dato’ Hishamuddin, YAA Dato’ Alauddin, YA Dato’ Ariffin Zakaria and even the late Tun Suffian have served in Alor Star.
Alor Star was then an attractive town to be transferred to – perhaps attractive to the transferor rather than the transferees, if I could use the such a term. Of course, if we are short of words we could always say “correct, correct, correct, correct”. All the years that I was in Kangar, Alor Star and Kuala Lumpur, Michael still kept in close contact with Adelene. My wife and I often wondered why their relationship was on such abiding and firm footing. His attention and focus was never, even for a moment, averted to any other girl. I couldn’t appreciate the reason why this was so until we got to really know Adelene, after a few years. Clearly, the reason is that Michael’s girl is so much like his mother, in character and disposition. Of course it is my hope that Adelene has chosen Michael because he so much like his father, but that would be presumptuous of me. Well, as many have said: “Michael is a chip of the old block”. If you know my character, need I say more?
Young single women today faced a serious problem when it comes to finding a prospective husband, due to the following observations. It has been said that “Fifty per cent of all available men are married or spoken for. Another 30 per cent are gay and a further 10 per cent are jerks. This would mean that single women have so little choice as they are running around trying to attract only 10 per cent of men”. You may, through your own observation, assign your own percentages to the above, but the gist of this observation is not wholly baseless. Then, there is also this audacious but humorous comment by a wit as to why ladies today are still single: “Nice men are ugly; handsome men are not nice; handsome and nice men are gay; handsome, nice and heterosexual men are married; men who are not so handsome, but are nice men, have no money; men who are not so handsome, but are nice men with money, think women are only after their money; handsome men without money are after women’s money; handsome men, who are not so nice and somewhat heterosexual, don’t think women are beautiful enough; men that are heterosexual, somewhat nice and have money and who think women are beautiful, are cowards; men who are somewhat handsome, somewhat nice and have some money and thank god are heterosexual, are shy and NEVER MAKE THE FIRST MOVE!!!; men who never make the first move, automatically lose interest in women when they take the initiative. Now, who the hell understands men?”. So, having carefully observed and tested the character of Michael and Adelene, I am convinced that they are indeed within the lucky 10 per cent in their mutual choice.
Let us consider the institution of marriage, of which much have been said and advised. Cyril Connally says that: “The particular charm of marriage is the duologue, the permanent conversation between two people who talk over everything and everyone. A happy marriage is a long conversation that always seems too short”. Don Fraser and Doug Larson have opined that: “A happy home is one in which each spouse grants the possibility that the other may be right, though neither believes it” and “More marriages survive if the partners realized that sometimes the better comes after the worse.” On the other hand let me now quote the famous centenarian Mr. George Burns who declared: “Lots pf people have asked me what Gracie and I did to make our marriage work. It’s simple – we didn’t do anything. I think the trouble with a lot of people is that they work too hard at staying married. They make a business out of it. When you work too hard at a business you get tired; and when you get tired you get grouchy; and when you get grouchy you start fighting; and when you start fighting you’re out of business.” This man lived to 101 years old. I don’t believe him, so I won’t live to a hundred – perhaps only long enough to write my memoirs. But he is a comedian who would think you are crazy if you believe him. Then, there is one Mr. Ogden Nash who wrote that: “To keep your marriage brimming with love in a loving cup, whenever you’re wrong admit it; whenever you are right shut up”. Well, if you agree with his last advice, don’t marry a good judge, for he will never shut up if he thinks he is right.
To all those who have irretrievably tied the knot my advice is to be fair and gracious to each other and think positively. And, to all those who intend to commit themselves to a marriage partnership, do chose a spouse with the right genes. Here you have a choice, unlike what I have said about how to be a good judge: “it is easy, just have the right genes”. The following excerpts from my address to the Perak Barristers of the Inns of Court, London at a dinner in Syuen Hotel, Ipoh on 16th February 2001 (see (2001)2MLJ pg.xxxvii), could bear recall:
“In this critical periods of judicial history, what, you may wish to ask, are the essential qualities of a judge? In my opinion, when considering a candidate for this high office, which exclusively involves the dispensation of (and not dispensing with) justice, the qualities to look for are in the following order of priority: (i) intellectual honesty with unquestionable probity and integrity; (ii) analytical prowess; (iii) industry and a good command of language; (iv) knowledge of the law; (v) judicial temperament; and (vi) a keen awareness of the prevailing milieu or conditions in the society in which he or she functions. The first two qualities are innate, and the rest may be acquired. In this regard, I wholly support the Bar’s view that in order to ensure objectivity in the evaluation of a potential candidate’s suitability for appointment as Judicial Commissioners, or for confirmation and promotion of judges, he or she should first be vetted by a worthy and credible selection board” (now taken to mean a Judicial Appointments Commission).
We certainly have in our midst good judges who, for the sake of this beloved nation, would inexorably march to their personal calamity in answer to the call of their immutable genes.
It is an incontrovertible truism that every act of integrity, compassion, unflinching courage and sacrifice demonstrated to our children would encourage them to emulate our example. What will matter is how long we will be remembered, by whom and for what, and whether our children will be proud to declare the name of their father. Live so that when your children think of fairness and integrity they think of you. A further observation in that, couples who are happily married have learnt to live with their spouse with tolerance, even though their patience might wear thin at times. They have accepted each other’s faults and are willing to compromise. Life brings unpredictable circumstances; happiness, sadness, success, disappointments and failure – all these are part of sharing a life together. You do not need to love your in-laws if they are unlovable, but your relationship with them must always be fair and correct. It is wise to always bear in mind that your spouse and children are watching you - silently.
As there are many good judges here, sitting or retired, who grace this occasion, I must take this opportunity to venture this comment. The judiciary has been criticized by members of the public at most functions, even our friends and secretaries tell us so. But let me say this : our only shield against such lambasting is to administer justice with good conscience as reflected in our written judgments. I must congratulate those judges who have written such good, honest-to-God judgments. It is perhaps appropriate to quote what Julian Huxley has to say about the eternal permanency of the written word: “By speech first, but far more by writing, man has been able to put something of himself beyond death. In tradition and in books an integral part of the individual persists, for it can influence the minds and action of other people in different places and at different times: a row of black marks on a page can move a man to tears, though the bones of him that wrote it are long ago crumbled to dust”. Since this is true, it would thus follow that our children and grand children would have to live with the good or the bad that is reflected in our written judgments. We do not write to please anyone but only the Judge of History and the Judge of Conscience. It is now obvious to the wise and perceptive that we are inhabitants of a globalised world governed by the dictates of an IT driven cyberspace, where there is hardly any shelter for the corrupt. The above quotation by Julian Huxley was crafted in very potent language. So also was the following words of the late Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., a great orator, that will ring in my ears until I draw my last breath: “I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the colour of their skin but by the content of their character.”
Indeed, I believe that our beloved nation would never be one nation until the majority of its citizens abide by Rev. Martin Luther King’s dream. Now, in the context of the institution of marriage, I would add that it is the character of your spouse that will determine the fullness of the content of your happiness. It is good to have a way with words, like Martin Luther and Julian Huxley. It is not so good to have a way with women, because your good wife would not be happy and you may be accused of being a womanizer or a dead wood, hence not promoted; of course, the real reason may perhaps be that you do not have a way with men.
Lots of advice to the married couple from me, but I have a wish. My wish is that, at the end of a long and fruitful day in their lives together, my son could hold the same sentiments of his wife as I do of my beloved – of whom I have this to say, and I say it now before all of you. Providence has indeed endowed me with the perpetual freshness of her extrinsic beauty and more importantly, the beauty of her intrinsic character. She is totally incapable of any rancour or spite to anyone, while generous to a fault with her abiding love for me and the children. Certain kinks in the character of most men are often only tempered by the sensitive tact of a perceptive wife. Talking about irascible men, yet I may be genetically programmed to excel such men on this score at times. Many husbands think that their good wives are skillful only on the mundane irrelevant things in life. Little do they realize that it is precisely the mundane features of life such as the emotional support derived from wifely companionship through fair and foul weather, that is not only relevant in this turbulent world, but would keep their husbands on even keel. Yet if, upon reflections during interludes of quietude, a husband could appreciate this salutary feature of his relationship, his marriage would develop into a blissful tryst with destiny. I am indeed fortunate not to have to look elsewhere for love or solace, being ever so grateful to God for this masterpiece of His creation, that has so fortuitously come my way, to walk with me, hand in hand, in my sole and solitary journey through this Earth.
I must thank my honoured guests who have so graciously taken time off to be present here tonight to grace the occasion. The invitation was perforce, extended to only such a limited number of our friends. This is a truly small party where all of you have clearly reciprocated so graciously to my hand of friendship by being here tonight, mindful that some of my invitees could not be present due to the sacred call of duty to perform the Haj. This is what I would call the strength of significance in small numbers. My sincere thanks to all of you here tonight.

Friday, July 4, 2008

Rule by Law Killed the Rule of Law

News and Events June 16th, 2008
Has Rule by Law Killed the rule of Law in Malaysia?

Professor Ratna Rueban Balasubramaniam will be presenting his paper “Has Rule by Law Killed the Rule of Law in Malaysia?” on July 23, 2008, to the Faculty of Law at the National University of Singapore.

The writer considers "the use of the legal form as a cloak for arbitrary power, creates a serious problem of domination that can undermine the law-like character of legal order as a framework of norms that should facilitate the interests of legal subjects".

He refers to the decision by Malaysia’s highest court, the Federal Court, in Public, Prosecutor v. Kok Wah Kuan, where the majority rejected the separation of powers as an ‘integral’ feature of the constitutional order while the sole dissenting judge defended the principle as fundamental to democracy and the rule of law.


http://www2.carleton.ca/law/has-rule-by-law-killed-the-rule-of-law-in-malaysia/

This decision is reproduced hereinbelow for your reading. Please feel free to refer to the conclusion where the judge states "But as judges we have to apply the law as it exists. We simply have no choice whatever in the matter." and work backwords from this.




DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA (BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN JENAYAH NO. W – 05 – 69 – 2003ANTARA KOK WAH KUAN … PERAYU DAN PENDAKWA RAYA … RESPONDEN (Daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Kuala Lumpur Perbicaraan Jenayah Bil. 45-27-2002) Coram: Gopal Sri Ram, J.C.A. Zulkefli bin Ahmad Makinudin, J.C.A. Raus Sharif, J.C.A. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT1. The appellant before us was convicted of the offence ofmurder under section 302 of the Penal Code alleged to have been committed on 30 May 2002 in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur. He was then 12 years and 9 months old. His conviction was entered on 1 July 2003 and he was ordered to be detained during the pleasure of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong pursuant tosection 97(2) of the Child Act 2001. Section 97 reads as follows: “(1) A sentence of death shall not be pronounced or recorded against a person convicted of an offence if it appears to the Court that at the time when the offence was committed he was a child.

In lieu of a sentence of death, the Court shallorder a person convicted of an offence to be detained in a prison during the pleasure of – (a) the Yang di-Pertuan Agong if the offence was committed in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur or the Federal Territory of Labuan; or (b) the Ruler or the Yang di-Pertua Negeri, if the offence was committed in the State. (3) If the Court makes an order under subsection (2) that person shall, notwithstanding anything in this Act— (a) be liable to be detained in such prisonand under such conditions as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Ruler or the Yang di-Pertua Negeri may direct; and (b) while so detained, be deemed to be in lawful custody. (4) If a person is ordered to be detained at a prison under subsection (2), the Board of Visiting Justices for that prison

3(a) shall review that person's case at leastonce a year; and (b) may recommend to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Ruler or the Yang di-Pertua Negeri on the early release or further detention of that person and the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Ruler orthe Yang di-Pertua Negeri may thereupon order him to be released or furtherdetained, as the case may be.” 2. The appellant now argues that section 97 is ultra vires theFederal Constitution in that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers housed in the supreme law. The argument is that the power to impose punishment in a criminal case is a judicial power.What section 97 does, according to learned counsel for the appellant, is to vest this judicial power of punishment in the Executive arm of the Federation. Two issues therefore arise out of the appellant’s complaint. First, whether the doctrine of separation of powers is an integral part of the Constitution: second, whether section 97 in pith and substance violates that doctrine. 3. Prior to 10 June 1988, Article 121 of the Constitution opened with the words “the judicial power of the Federation shall be vested”. This phrase was taken by the framers of our Constitution from section 71 of the Australian Constitution. It was interpreted by Griffith C.J. in Huddart, Parker and Co Proprietary Ltd v Moorehead (1908–1909) 8 CLR 330, to mean “…the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and itssubjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise of this power does not begin until some tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision … iscalled upon to take action.” This definition was cited with approval by the Privy Council in Shell Co of Australia Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation[1931] AC 275.4. However, by Act A704, Article 121 was amended with effect from 10 June 1988 and the expression “judicial power” was deleted. No challenge as to the constitutionality of Act A704 was ever taken before any court. To our minds such a challenge, even if taken, would have failed because the amendment did not have the effect of divesting the courts of the judicial power of the Federation. There are two reasons for this. First, the amendingAct did nothing to vest the judicial power in some arm of the Federation other than the courts. Neither did it provide for the sharing of the judicial power with the Executive or Parliament or both those arms of Government. Second, the marginal note to Article 121 was not amended. This clearly expresses the intention of Parliament not to divest the ordinary courts of the judicial power of the Federation and to transfer it to or share it with either the Executive or the Legislature. 5. Now, marginal notes are admissible guides to statutory interpretation. Indeed – “It is now well settled that a marginal note is a part of the section. It is the key to open the mind of the legislature by affording guidance in understanding their intendment.” See, TheFilm Exhibitors Guild v State AIR 1987 AP 110, per K Ramaswamy J on behalf of the Full Bench. Of course, guidelines for statutory interpretation should not be applied when interpreting a Constitution. See, Hinds v The Queen [1976] 1 All ER 353, per Lord Diplock. But, a marginalnote in a written Constitution is nevertheless part of the supreme law and “furnishes some clue as to the meaning and purpose of the Article”. See, Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd v State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 661, per Das, Ag CJ at para. 24. In Sugumar Balakrishnan v Pengarah Imigresen Negeri Sabah & Anor [1998] 3 MLJ 289, this Court said: “The Constitution of Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) does not even mention the expressionjudicial power. Yet, upon high authority it hasbeen held that despite the omission, the provisions in that document: ‘… manifest an intention to secure in the judiciary a freedom from political,legislative and executive control. They are wholly appropriate in a Constitution which intends that judicial power shall be vested only in the judicature. They would be inappropriate in a Constitution by which it was intended that judicial power should be shared by the executive or the legislature. The Constitution’s silence as to the vesting of judicial power is consistent with its remaining, where it had lain for more than a century, in thehands of the judicature. It is not consistent with any intention that henceforth it should pass to or be shared by, the executive or the legislature (perLord Pearce in Liyanage v The Queen[1967] 1 AC 259 at p 287).’The Indian Constitution also does not make mention of judicial power being vested in thejudiciary. Yet, the same position obtains there as in Sri Lanka. See Minerva Mills Ltd v Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789. Like the Constitutions of Sri Lanka and India, the Federal Constitution preserves the separation of powers between the three arms of Government and evinces no intention that the judicial power ofthe Federation shall be passed to or shared with the Executive or the Legislature. It follows thatthe judicial power of the Federation remainswhere it has always been, namely, with the judiciary.” That is a view to which we still adhere. 7. In Hinds v The Queen, Lord Diplock made two observations that are applicable to the case at hand. In the first place he said ofthe Jamaican Constitution that – “It is taken for granted that the basic principle of separation of powers will apply to the exercise of their respective functions by these three organsof government.” He then made this further observation:“What, however, is implicit in the very structure of a Constitution on the Westminster model is that judicial power, however it be distributed from time to time between various courts, is to continue to be vested in persons appointed to hold judicial office in the manner and on the terms laid down in the Chapter dealing with the judicature, even though this is not expressly stated in the Constitution: Liyanage v The Queen[1967] 1 AC 259, 287-288.” 8. Based on the foregoing discussion, it is in our judgment beyond argument that the doctrine of separation of powers is very much an integral part of the Federal Constitution. Since Article 4(1) declares the Constitution to be the supreme law, it follows that any State action that violates the doctrine of separation of powers must be struck down as unconstitutional. And that brings us to the second issue that has fallen for determination. 9. In support of his argument that section 97(2) violates the doctrine of separation of powers between the Executive and theJudiciary, learned counsel for the appellant relied on Director ofPublic Prosecutions v Mollison [2003] UKPC 6. The facts ofthat case were these. The accused, Mollison was convicted of the murder one Leila Brown during a robbery, an offence which, by the law of Jamaica carried the death penalty. However, as Mollison was 19 years at the date of his conviction the trial judge, acting under section 29(1) of the Juveniles Act 1951 of Jamaica,ordered detention during the Governor-General’s pleasure. Subsections (1) and (4) of that section provided as follows: “(1) Sentence of death shall not be pronounced on or recorded against a person convicted of an offence if it appears to the Court that at the time when the offence was committed he was under the age of eighteen years, but in place thereof the court shall sentence him to be detained duringHer Majesty’s pleasure, and, if so sentenced, he shall, notwithstanding anything in the otherprovisions of this Law, be liable to be detained in such place (including, save in the case of a child, an adult correctional centre) and under such conditions as the Minister may direct, and while so detained shall be deemed to be in legal custody. (4) The Governor-General may release on licence any person detained under subsection (1) or (3) of this section. Such licence shall be in such form and contain such conditions as the Governor-General may direct, and may at any time be revoked or varied by the Governor-General. Where such licence is revoked the person to whom it relates shall return forthwith to such place as the Governor-General maydirect, and if he fails to do so may be arrested by any constable without warrant and taken to such place.” 10. Mollison argued that section 29 was incompatible with the separation of judicial from executive power which he said was afundamental principle upon which the Constitution of Jamaica was built. The argument found favour with the Privy Council. Lord Bingham of Cornhill who delivered the advice of the Board after having initially considered the accused’s submission on the point ambitious nevertheless treated it as having already been settled by the Board’s decision in Hinds. He also made the following observation of section 29 which, in our judgment, is the fulcrum upon which the case turned: “It is also a key feature of this sentence inJamaica (although no longer in the United Kingdom) that the decision on release is entrusted to the Governor-General as a memberof the executive. Section 29(4) of the Juveniles Act as amended has that express effect. This feature also has been clearly recognised: see The State v O’Brien [1973] IR 50 at 59-60, 64, 71-72; R v Secretary of State, Ex p Venables [1998] AC 407 at 498-499, 519-524, 530-532; Browne v the Queen [2000] 1 AC 45 at 48; V v United Kingdom (1999) 30 EHRR 121, paras 110-111. Thus while, in a case falling within section 29(1), the judge sitting in court passes sentence, it falls to the executive to determine the measure of punishment which an individual detainee will undergo: Hinds v The Queen [1977] AC 195 at227-228. It is clear that such determination is for all legal and practical purposes a sentencing exercise: see R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 3 WLR 1800, pp 1812, 1822-1823, 1830, [2002] UKHL 46, paras 24, 52, 74 and the authorities there cited.” 11. Two points emerge from the above-quoted passage. First, the power to pass sentence and the power to determine the measure of punishment are both part of the judicial power. Second, that section 29 consigned the latter power to the Executive. We may add that our courts have already held that the sentencing power is a judicial power. Thus in Public Prosecutor v Dato’ Yap Peng [1987] 2 MLJ 311, Zakaria Yatim J (whose decision was upheld by the Supreme Court) said: “In the context of criminal law, the Court possesses the judicial power to try a person foran offence committed by him and to pass sentence against him if he is found guilty.” 12. Now, look at section 97(2). It is clear from its plain readingthat Parliament has consigned the power to determine the measure of the sentence that is to be served to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in the case of an offence committed in any of the Federal Territories and to the Ruler or Governor in the case of the severalStates of the Federation. By Article 39 of our Constitution, the executive authority of the Federation is vested in the Yang di Pertuan Agong. Save on certain matters that are not in issue here, the Yang di Pertuan Agong is a constitutional monarch and must, in accordance with Article 40(1), act in accordance with the advice given him by the Cabinet or a particular Minister of the Cabinet.
Thus – “when one finds in the Constitution itself or in a Federal law powers conferred upon the Yang di-Pertuan Agong that are expressed to be exercisable if he is of opinion or is satisfied that a particular state of affair exists or that particularaction is necessary, the reference to his opinion or satisfaction is in reality a reference to the collective opinion or satisfaction of the members of the Cabinet, or the opinion or satisfaction of a particular Minister to whom the Cabinet have delegated their authority to give advice upon the matter in question”, per Lord Diplock in Teh Cheng Poh v Public Prosecutor [1979] 1 MLJ 50. 13. In our judgment, applying settled principles, section 97(2) clearly contravenes the doctrine of separation of powers housed in the Constitution by consigning to the Executive the judicial power to determine the measure of the sentence that is to be served by the instant appellant. Section 97(4) does not, in our considered judgment, rescue the second subsection from unconstitutionality. If anything it compounds the problem. For, that subsection doesin fact confirm that it is the Yang di Pertuan Agong who
determines the measure of the sentence that is to be served, save that it is a power that is exercised on the advice of a Board ofVisiting Justices. Hence section 97(4) is merely a procedural adjunct to the principal power to determine the measure of the sentence that the appellant is to serve. 14. There are two short matters that need to be dealt with beforewe conclude. First, it was pointed out during argument that there may be other statutes, e.g., section 348 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which make provision for the detention of persons at the pleasure of the Yang di Pertuan Agong, or a Ruler or Governor. It was said that striking down section 97(2) may affect those otherprovisions. With respect, we do not agree. As was pointed out by the Indian Supreme Court in In re the Special Courts Bill, 1978 AIR 1979 SC 478, the constitutionality of a particular provision must be determined in each case as it arises. Our conclusion that section 97(2) is inconsistent with the Constitution does not extend to a declaration of unconstitutionality of other equipollent provisions. The validity of these other provisionsmust be dealt with on a case by case basis as and when the occasion arises. In the specific case of section 348 of the CriminalProcedure Code, it is a pre-Merdeka and hence a pre-Constitution provision. It must therefore be dealt with in accordance with the principles set out in Assa Singh v Menteri Besar, Johore [1969] 152 MLJ 30 which were applied by this Court in Kerajaan Negeri Selangor v Saggong Tasi [2005] 4 CLJ 169. In the case of pre-Merdeka statutes, the courts are empowered to “apply the existing law with such modifications as may be necessary to bring it into accord with the Constitution”: Surinder Singh Kanda v The Federation of Malaya [1962] MLJ 169, per Lord Denning). Wedo not have such a power in respect of laws enacted post-Merdeka. In respect of such laws, the only power we have, under Article 4(1) of the Constitution is to either uphold them as being intra vires the supreme law or strike them down as being inconsistent with it. Consequently, once a law is found to violate the Constitution the court has no choice but to declare it void and of no effect. So much for the constitutional ground. 15. The other point in the case is this. Learned counsel for the appellant when opening his argument said that quite apart from the constitutional argument, there were other grounds in the petition of appeal which he said he would leave on file. This, of course, required the learned deputy who responded to the appeal to argue the merits of the appeal. We must say at once that this was a gruesome murder and that there is abundant material on record to support the conviction of the appellant. The victim in this case was found to have had 20 stab wounds. This clearly points to an intention to kill. There is absolutely no evidence to bring the case within one of exceptions. The learned trial judge admirably dealt with the evidence and drew the proper inferences from it. In our judgment the conviction is therefore entirely safe. 16. What is to be the upshot? This is a case in which Parliament has provided for the entry of a conviction and passing of sentence but has made no valid law for the measure of sentence. A similar situation arose in Soon Kim Seng v Public Prosecutor [1978] 2 MLJ 107. There, the accused was convicted on 3 charges of having in his possession contrivances capable of being used for the purposes of making infringing copies of textbooks the copyrightsof which were vested in the complainant. He was sentenced to a fine of $1,500 on each of the 3 charges. He appealed on the ground that the legislation had not provided for any fine orpunishment for the possession of a duplicating contrivance. Chang Min Tat J, in allowing the appeal held, with regret, thatParliament had failed to provide a punishment for the offence in question. He accordingly upheld the conviction but set aside the sentence. We must with like regret follow suit. Here, Parliament has said that the appellant shall not, by reason of his age, receive the capital punishment but has made no valid law conferring power upon the courts to impose some other sentence. We would have been inclined to impose life imprisonment in this case but unfortunately our written law does not contain any equipollent provision that exists under Jamaican law. 17. For the reasons already given the appeal against conviction isdismissed. However, the sentence passed is set aside. We will now hear arguments on the consequential orders that we should make on this appeal. 18. In conclusion we must say that this is a tragic case. Liyangeand Hinds have been in the law reports since 1967 and 1976 respectively. Both have been applied by our courts long before the Child Act was drafted. It is unfortunate that those charged with the drafting of the Child Act did not pay proper attention to the decided cases. If they had done so, the incongruent and unfortunate circumstances now before this Court may well have been avoided. But as judges we have to apply the law as it exists. We simply have no choice whatever in the matter. Dated this 12th day of July 2007. Gopal Sri Ram Judge, Court of Appeal Malaysia Counsel for the appellant: Karpal Singh (Ramkarpal Singhwith him) Solicitors for the appellant: Tetuan Karpal Singh & Co. Counsel for the respondent: Yaacob Sam (Mangai with him) Solicitors for the respondent: Peguam Negara Malaysia.

Thursday, July 3, 2008

The Rule of Law

World's top legal experts unveil 'rule of law' index aimed at measuring how nations behave ... The Associated Press What is the the rule of law? The concept can be traced from in Plato’s, Statesman & Law and Aristotle’s Politic but simply put by AV Dicey; supremacy of law in contrast to arbitrary power, equality before the law for all classes in ordinary courts and the law of the constitution. He said this in In his treatise, Law of the Constitution. Respectfully, it is a “CONCEPT” and not part of an “equation”. Yes, the Rule of Law is not a rule after all. Forgive me, for all those who are going to banter with me on this one. However in over quest to rationalise all, an equation (or several of them) have surfaced to give us an indication “who’s been naughty and who’s been good” (pun intended) Refer to Earthtrends http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/environmental-governance/variable-1280.html We have Kaufmann’s Rule of Law Index. http://humandevelopment.bu.edu/dev_indicators/show_info.cfm?index_id=121&data_type=1 We even have a map http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Maprl.png#file Just to conclude with something from Thomas Paine's Common Sense "For as in absolute governments the king is law, so in free countries the law ought to be king; and there ought to be no other." Link this up do the decision in Public Prosecutor v. Kok Wah Kuan which has been reproduced in this blog at the conclusion where the judge states "But as judges we have to apply the law as it exists. We simply have no choice whatever in the matter." and you have a starting point on the rule of law.

You are Special

"There has never been another you.

With no effort on your part you were born to be something very special and set apart.

What you are going to do in appreciation of that gift is a decision only you can make."

Dan Zadra

Idioms - Law

Bandit territory
An area or an industry, profession, etc, where rules and laws are ignored or flouted is bandit territory.
Barrack-room lawyer
(UK) A barrack-room lawyer is a person who gives opinions on things they are not qualified to speak about.
Kangaroo court
When people take the law into their own hands and form courts that are not legal, these are known as kangaroo court.
Law unto yourself
If somebody's a law unto themselves, they do what they believe is right regardless of what is generally accepted as correct.
Lay down the law If someone lays down the law, they tell people what to do and are authoritarian.
Letter of the law
If people interpret laws and regulations strictly, ignoring the ideas behind them, they follow the letter of the law.
Sod's law I always thought it was Murphy's Law
Sod's law states that if something can go wrong then it will.
Spirit of the law The spirit of the law is the idea or ideas that the people who made the law wanted to have effect.

Tuesday, July 1, 2008

Pulau Besar ("Big Island"), Melaka

Off the Coast of the Historical City of Melaka, there is an island known as Pulau Besar which is of immense historical significance.

At Lot 840 there is a holy tomb of Shaikh Ismail ibn ‘Abd al-Qadir ibn ‘Abd al-Jabbar ibn Salih ibn ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani, qaddasallahu sirrah (r.a.), also known as Sultan Al-Arifin Syeikh Ismail (the “Holy Tomb”). Sultan Arifin was accorded the title of “Wali”/Saint.

Pulau Besar also surfaces in Ming Dynasty record as “Wu-Shu” and used as landmarks in the emperor’s voyages.

It is estimated that this Holy Tomb is over 700 years old. Together with this Holy Tomb is the tomb of Sharifah Rodziah and his teacher, Sheikh Yusuf as-Siddiq. Sultan Arifin who is said to be the 4th generation descendant of the infamous Sufi grandmaster Sheikh Abdul Qadir al-Jilani, the guide the Muslim population of Samudera, the Peninsular and the Malay Archipelago. It is said that many embraced Islam through the grandmasters’ guidance.


Nevertheless, the Holy Tomb is visited by countless numbers of visitors sans race, religion and cultural background;

Visitors to the Holy Tomb include visitors from all other countries including Singapore, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, etc. There is also an influx of Muslim visitors to the Holy Tomb. During the Muslim celebrations of Maulud Rasul, visitors to the Holy Tomb exceed tens of thousands. This is during the months of Rabiul Awal and Rabiul Akhir (twice) where many visitors attend the Holy Tomb;


The Holy Tomb has been managed over the 700 years or so by its caretakers who have handed down these responsibilities from one generation to another.

Nearing the Holy Tomb is another historical site – the Makam Tujuh Adik-Beradik, tomb/shrine of the seven princesses. The seven princesses from India who while on a visited to Pulau Besar were struck down by illness and died. They were buried on the island and their graves marked with the shrine.

In 1991, the various significant structures at Lot 840 and PT No.10 including the Holy Tomb were demolished by the Defendants/Jabatan Agama Islam Melaka and/or their agents. Further the said Makam Tujuh Adik-Beradik was “transferred” to Lot 840.

Coincidentally, a few days later the largest dam in the state called Empangan Durian Runtuh suddenly “dried-up”. Where did the water go? The state of Malacca underwent difficult times for almost a year.

Further, there are regulated rules of conduct to be observed on the Island. Alcohol nor pork ought NOT to be brought onto the Island. Many boats are said to have capsized as a consequence. Dressing codes and rude and immoral conduct of her visitors have also been equally “punished”. …. Truth or fiction?

The Holy Tomb and the other structures were restored and reconstructed in 1999.

It is said that vows & boons are prayed for and received here making Pulau Besar somewhat special to its visitors. Whatsoever their wish, it is undisputed that its cultural and historical heritage of primary significant.

Sunday, June 22, 2008

Abandoned Projects

Where the required bylaws and safeguard against the errant developers are not present, more often than not, there is misuse of funds and/or mismanagement, leaving the housing project abandoned. The developer facing “Chapter 11” provides no way out for the innocent homebuyers and/or investors.

In the event, there is subsists a bridging loan, that is a loan between the developer and his bank to finance the development, the bank must be vigilant in exercises their rights as debenture holder.

A conservative approach may result in chaos as if the bank is reluctant to step into the shoes of the developer, and even on some occasions financially assist. The errant developer would have fled leaving the project abandoned and the purchases without remedy.

This would leave the end financier, that is the purchasers’ bank in a total lurch. The bank and the purchasers are in no position to exercise any leverage, particularly against the delinquent developer.

The end financier is then left without the landed security to foreclose. The quite unlucky innocent purchaser continues to pay interest on his borrowings (and not principal). Sometimes, the best solution is for the purchaser to pay off the loan.

This is why we have avidly recommended that the end financier and the bridging financier be one and the same. Interestingly, who will push on this?

It would be in the end financier interest to push the bridging financier but ,it is the bridging financier that usually chosen first. Hence the prudent developer would push for the bridging financier to end finance. However, most prudent developers aren’t recalcitrant. Thus, should the burden fall back again on the innocent purchaser and homebuyer. Purchasers should be forewarned in instances where the bridging financier has not taken up the end financing as well.

Needless to say, as confusing all of this is, the solution provided above isn’t holistic and the purchaser must be left to fend for his own.

In a decided case, the purchasers formed a collective action legal committee and commenced legal proceedings for liquidated damages. One may ask what is the wisdom in this? Using the liquidated damages, the purchasers entered into a settlement with an independent contractor to complete the development using the unsold units. The end financiers supported the purchasers on this and became co-plaintiffs in some occasions. The developer succumbed to this on the threat of the purchasers’ winding up the developer. The independent contractor completed the project with some reservations. Thereafter, the purchasers wound up the developer appointed a provisional liquidator to complete the developer’s duties. A Committee of Inspection and Joint Management Body were set up etc.

This was an interesting solution to an intriguing problem.

The relevant bodies must ensure that there are safeguards put in place prohibiting and discouraging errant developers from manipulating this once “unguarded fence” which is still failing. The current push for developers to sell “completed units” even at a premium is still advantages in the authors’ opinion until a better solution to remedy the problem surfaces.

Thursday, June 19, 2008

Negligence

Atkin vs Brightman

Lord Atkin's "neighbour" principle


“You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer seems to be — persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions that are called in question”

In 1990, the case of Caparo Industries v. Dickman was decided by the House of Lord. Many commentaries have suggested that Caparo has now “narrowed” the famous dicta by Atkin.

In Caparo Industries v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, the House of Lords established what is known as the "three-fold test",

duty of care to another is established by:-
·the harm must be a "reasonably foreseeable" result of the defendant's conduct
·a relationship of "proximity" between the defendant and the claimant
·it must be "fair, just and reasonable" to impose liability

The "three stage" test was first formulated by Bingham LJ


Wednesday, June 18, 2008

Blame

"All blame is a waste of time. No matter how much fault you find with another, and regardless of how much you blame him, it will not change you. The only thing blame does is to keep the focus off you when you are looking for external reasons to explain your unhappiness or frustration. You may succeed in making another feel guilty about something by blaming him, but you won't succeed in changing whatever it is about you that is making you unhappy." Wayne Dyer

The MV KUMAR Work Day

productivity and time management mantras

There are two ways to live: you can live as if nothing is a miracle; you can live as if everything is a miracle. .. Albert Einstein

Before Work Begin, Before You Leave & Anytime Necessary
Motivate/De-Stress/Visualize

Do not commence work in haste,
think about your short & long-term goals ...
steps needed

Mentally, take a step back and visualize yourself floating above your work place and looking down – you will definitely feel more relaxed, and you will probably see things in a different perspective.

Breathing .... very very important

"The practice of mindful breathing can lead to the release of all suffering." ... Margo Adair

Place hand on stomach. Make (Notice) your hand and stomach rise and fall when you breathe. Properly done, your chest will remain while your stomach will rise, when inhaling and vide versa. DO this on the counts of five.

Taking mental breaks like this might guide you towards a different direction in solving long-standing problems. Use this time to remotivate yourself, because unless you are motivated, you cannot motivate others. Also, making your work a pleasure will greatly diminish your stress.

Problems cannot be solved by the same level of thinking that created them. .. Albert Einstein

make a “to-do” list of things

If you don't know where you are going, any road will get you there. … Lewis Carroll

a) today’s
Set Priorities - High priority projects should also be done first - and then look into the lower priority jobs. If there are too many jobs for you to handle, delegate to jointly handle them

b) & Tomorrow‘s Draft list

Set Daily Goal
a) Estimating time accurately
b) Scheduling simple projects
c) Time planning for small and medium sized projects
d) Aides Memoire

An Aide Memoire (Memory aid) is a structured list of points that should be considered when solving a particular/specific problem –
considered all relevant factors, eg –


What CAN be done – no problemo,
What are usual problems/mistakes/”let downs”,
How to rise above the challenges, end results etc.

Often this makes the difference between carrying out a task effectively and making a mess of it, particularly when you are under pressure

Before you start some work, always ask yourself three questions –
(1) Why am I doing it,
(2) What the results might be; and
(3) Will I be successful.
Only when you think deeply and find satisfactory answers to these questions, go ahead… Chanakya


Focus on the Job At Hand
Instead of taking on too many tasks at one time and not completing most of them, concentrate on one job at a time and finish it off as quickly as possible. This will give you greater satisfaction on completion of those jobs.
This will reduce the risk of having to face the challenges in the items 5, 2 & 3 herein

Resolve Not To Procrastinate

Procrastination is the bane of the small business owner because every task has to get done sooner or later. If possible, get large tasks over with early in the morning, when you are still fresh and energetic.

Why do we Procrastinate?
You procrastinate when you put off things. Usually in favor of doing something that is more enjoyable or comfortable. Investing time in wrong tasks. Not understanding the difference between an urgent tasks and important tasks but jumping straight into it - reacting fast. Not thinking - driven by demands which are loudest.
Feeling overwhelmed by the task or Perfectionism ("I don't have the right skills or resources to do this perfectly now, so I won't do it at all."). A fear of failure or success. Waiting for the “right” mood or the “right” time to tackle the important task at hand.



Tuesday, May 27, 2008

Dormant Companies – “Wind-It Up”

Very common is the “joint venture vehicle”, (the shelf company purchased hurriedly by the investors) lost in its purpose, when such joint venture fails to take off. Sometimes, companies are formed for other motive (best known to its founding fathers) but later losing directions and purpose. The common mistake which its directors and shareholders do is to fail to wind up the company. The company is just left in abeyance. You should wind it up.

http://corporategovernancebangsar.blogspot.com/

A Question of Costs

The million-dollar question that the client poses to the lawyer does not necessarily entertain a million-dollar reply. The question – the confidant client then will ask, “won’t the other side pay for your legal fees when they lose?” (a fact which all client deem)

Clients, quite rightly, are often confused as to party-to-party cost and solicitor-client costs (which is actually legal fees). There are other types of costs awarded but we shall not get into that here.

Party-to-party cost is costs awarded to a party, usually the winning party, payable by the losing party. Unless otherwise directed (which is usually immediate/forthwith), costs are payable at the end of the proceedings.

Solicitor-client the latter is costs/legal fees as between the solicitor and client.

Both costs, if not agreed, are awarded pursuant to the Rules of the High Court (legislation which is usually “under-nourished”) and applied vide taxation proceeding. If Fees are Agreed, then the lawyer can commence legal proceedings for recovery.

It is common (in most jurisdictions), that party-to-party cost is significantly lesser in comparison to solicitor-client costs.

The rational being that whereas the losing party ought to, in all circumstances, be penalised to pay cost, the losing party has got no place to play in the appointment of an “expensive barrister” in contrast to an “inexpensive” counsel. Therefore, if a party wishes to appoint a barrister on a high retainer, that shall be that client’s prerogative. Nevertheless, the Court shall only award what is proper (legislated) and the fees, commonly referred to “getting-up fees” reflecting various matters including seniority of the counsel in question and subject matter (not counsel’s) expertise.

The bottom line, the litigant seldom receives 100% compensation of costs.

There are various repercussions to this premise which shall be examined on another occasion.

Wednesday, May 21, 2008

My University - Nudity on Campus

Comments


Audi alteram partem meaning, literally, hear the other side (I am sure they saw the other side) . However the Injunction was not granted because “the plaintiff had suffered no injustice”. There must be a serious question to be tried….


CHANCERY DIVISION
Glynn vs. Keele University and another
[1971] 2 All ER 89, [1971] 1 WLR 187

Natural justice - No opportunity given to student to be heard. Injunction - Injunction to restrain breach of rules of natural justice. Refusal of injunction.
Held
The powers of the vice-chancellor under s 6(4) of the statutes to suspend a student were so fundamental to the position of a student in the university that they could not be regarded merely as a matter of internal discipline; accordingly the vice-chancellor was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity when he exercised them; so acting he had not complied with the rules of natural justice in that he did not give the plaintiff a chance of being heard before he reached his decision on the infliction of a penalty.
However, the plaintiff had suffered no injustice; it was not disputed that he had been involved in the incident of 19th June, the offence was one which merited a severe penalty and the penalty imposed by the vice-chancellor was an intrinsically proper one; the fact that the plaintiff had merely been deprived of a right to make a plea in mitigation was insufficient to justify setting aside the decision; accordingly an injunction would be refused
INTRODUCTION
Motion. By notice of motion the plaintiff, Simon Vincent Glynn, sought, inter alia, an injunction against the University of Keele and William Alexander Campbell Stewart, the vice-chancellor of the university, restraining them from excluding the plaintiff from residence on the campus of the university for the remainder of the academic year 1970-71 and from impeding in any save a lawful was any application which the plaintiff might make for residence. The facts are set out in the judgment.
JUDGMENT BY PENNYCUICK V-C
In this action the plaintiff is Mr Simon Vincent Glynn who is a last year undergraduate at the University of Keele. The first defendant is the University of Keele itself; the second defendant is Mr William Alexander Campbell Stewart, who is the vice-chancellor of that university. I have before me a notice of motion whereby the plaintiff seeks an injunction restraining the defendants from excluding the plaintiff from residence on the campus of the university for the remainder of the current accademic year.
The present action, including the motion, arises from an incident on 19th June 1970; on that day a number of undergraduates of the university were standing or sitting naked on the campus of the university, and that incident gave rise to a great deal of trouble, as one would expect. In the present action there was no formal admission by the plaintiff that he was one of the undergraduates concerned; there is, however, evidence of identification, and there is nowhere in his affidavits, or in the speeches of counsel for him, any real suggestion that he was not one of the naked undergraduates on that occasion. I must plainly proceed to deal with this motion on the footing that he was in fact involved in this incident; in other words no issue of identification is raised. The sequence of events is set out by the vice-chancellor [the second defendant] in para 3 of an affidavit sworn by him on this motion, in which he states:
'On my return to Keele on the evening of the 19th June 1970, I received information that certain students had appeared naked in the area of the Students' Union on that day, causing offence to many members and employees of the University, and residents on the campus. I thereupon proceeded with an investigation into the affair, and by the 29th and 30th June 1970 I had received clear and reliable evidence that the incident had indeed occurred and that the offenders included the Plaintiff and certain students due to graduate on the 1st July. Term ended on the 30th June and the Graduation Ceremony was on the 1st July. If a Disciplinary Panel had been convened it could not have met until after the end of term, by which time the graduation students would no longer have been within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the University. In any case if I had invited those against whom the evidence was available to visit me and make any representation it was clear to me that few if any would have been able to come. To expedite the decision and to enable that decision to treat all involved on an equality whether graduating students or not I decided to exercise my disciplinary jurisdiction and to give to the students involved an opportunity to appeal to the Council. The Council was due to hold a meeting on 7th July 1970 at which meeting they could appoint a committee to hear any appeals which might have been lodged. I deliberately limited my punishment to that which may be recommended and inflicted by the Disciplinary Panel under Regulation XXX. Accordingly I wrote the letter to the plaintiff dated 1st July 1970.'
I will refer in a few minutes to the statutes, ordinances and regulations which govern the university. The letter dated 1st July referred to by the vice-chancellor is in these terms:
'Dear Mr. Glynn, You have been identified as having appeared naked in the area of the Students' Union on the 19th, 1970. This incident has offended many members and employees of the University and residents on the campus. It has also offended many people outside the University both locally and nationally. You cannot have been ignorant of the likely consequences of your action. Following upon the general responsibility of the Vice-Chancellor to the Council under Section 6 (3) of the Statutes for the efficiency and good order or the University, I shall report to the Council at its meeting on the 7th July that you have been fined £10 and excluded from residence in any residential accommodation on the University campus from today's date and for the whole of the session of 1970/1. I shall also report that the fine must be paid by the 1st October 1970, or you will not be readmitted to the University at the beginning of next term. If you wish to address any grievance in connection with the above to the Council under Section 19 (24) of the Statutes, you shouls send it in writing to the Registrar to reach him not later than Tuesday, 7th July.'
The plaintiff wrote a long letter to the registrar of the university for the attention of the council on 3rd July 1970. In that letter he stated that he wished to appeal against the decision of the vice-chancellor. That letter should be read in full:
'I wish to appeal against the decision of the Vice-Chancellor under Section 19 (24) of the statutes. I have received a letter from the Vice-Chancellor, in which he informs me that I "have" been identified as having appeared naked... I "have" been fined £10, and I "have" been excluded from campus residence for next year. All this has been done without any representation by myself or on my behalf, and hence I have not even had the opportunity to defend myself which is afforded to those accused of breaking the law of the land. Whilst the Vice-Chancellor may be acting within the letter of his statutory powers (which incidentally he assured the Parliamentary Commission he would never use), I do not feel that he has acted within the spirit of the Statutes, for I do not believe that any Government would ratify statutes that they believed would be used to entail [sic] the freedom of defence, or the freedom to plead mitigating circumstances, which are extended to subjects under the law of the land.
Furthermore, with all due respect, I do not believe that this, my representation in writing to the Council, (after the decision to punish has already been taken by the Vice-Chancellor), can in any way be truly described as a chance to defend myself, as I am not present to answer queries which may arise and any representation on my behalf at this late stage in the proceedings can only be retrospective in spirit. The section of the statute invoked by the Vice-Chancellor is section 6 (3), under which he is responsible to council for the efficiency and good order of the University. It cannot be denied that the threatened withdrawal of £20,000 from the University impinges upon its good order and efficiency. However, this withdrawal of money was not forseen by students and obviously was not forseen even by the Administration, for surely, if the Administration had forseen such awithdrawal of monies, they would have given a formal order, or made formal request to those who were sunbathing to put on their clothes. (WHICH IT SHOULD BE NOTED THEY AT NO TIME DID.)
Thus, the assertion by the Vice-Chancellor in his letter, that "you cannot have been ignorant of the likely consequences of your action", is clearly invalid and unfair for by what token can he assume that the students were aware of the "likely consequences" of their actions when it is obvious (from the lack of directive at the time from the administration to the students concerned) that not even the administration were aware of the possible outcome. The implications of the type of retrospective punishment being invoked in this situation are abhorent. To draw a parallel: if a member of this Council while driving home accidentally ran over and killed a pedestrian it could be argued retrospectively that that man had killed a pedestrian because he had driven home, and thus, to drive home constitutes a blameworthy offence. However, I believe that any rational human being will see that the driver should not be punished for he did not intend to kill the pedestrian and had no way of knowing the outcome of his action. As I have argued earlier, despite the assertion to the contrary by the Vice-Chancellor, the students involved in sunbathing at Keele had no way of knowing that it would lead to a withdrawal of £ 20,000 from the University. Nor do I believe that in this day and age when nude plays, nudist colonies and health farms flourish, and when we are - one would hope - less inhibited and less restricted by the proven psychologically harmful aftermath of Victorian prudishness, that any student could reasonably be expected to think that such a harmless action could have such repercussions.
In conclusion then, may I ask the members of Council to consider my appeal with the open minded rationalism of which I am convinced they are possessed. I would further like to point out that I have a lot more to say on this subject and in all fairness feel sure that the Council members will realise that had I been allowed to be present, I would have been able to clarify the situation far better than I can do in this letter, furthermore as I am not present and there is consequently no feed-back I am unable to answer any queries or objections that I am sure will be raised. In view of this may I beg to appear in person before the council if there is any question of my appeal being rejected.
Yours faithfully, Simon V. Glynn.
P.S. I am a finalist next year and in view of the travelling involved, the structure of my timetable and the fact that I should have to rely upon Public Transport, I feel that exclusion from campus residence would have an extremely detrimental effect upon my examination performance.'
Having heard no more, according to his affidavit, the plaintiff went abroad at the end of July. On 10th August a letter was written to the plaintiff giving him notice that the date of his appeal had been fixed for 2nd September. The plaintiff himself did not, according to his own evidence, receive that letter until he came home from abroad considerably after 2nd September. His mother acknowledged the letter and stated her own views. In the event, on the date fixed for hearing the appeal, the plaintiff was not present or represented, and accordingly the decision of the vice-chancellor stood.
The plaintiff has given evidence to the effect that he has been seriously inconvenienced by his exclusion from residence on the campus. I need not, I think, go through the particulars of the matter. It will be sufficient to say that although separate accommodation in the village of Keele was offered to him, he did not find that accommodation acceptable, or perhaps practicable, for one reason or another, and in the event he found lodgings some ten miles away. That involves a daily journey to and from the campus, and unfortunately in November he had an accident which involved his car in being a total write-off, so that the inconvenience is considerably augmented. I should mention that the plaintiff in fact paid the £10 fine in order to get back to his studies. In those circumstances the writ in this action was issued, and notice of motion dated 2nd December was given.

Tuesday, May 20, 2008

The Malaysian Chapter - Some thoughts on s218(1) of the Companies Act, 1965

1) Section 218(1) of the Companies Act (Malaysian Companies Act 1965) sets out the circumstances in which a company may be wound up by the Court, of which s218(1)(e) being one of the “common” grounds i.e. inability of the company to pay its debts.

2) Upon service and the non-payment of a s218 notice, the presumption under s218(2)(a) will be invoked that the company is deemed unable to pay its debts.

Judgment

3) It is also trite law that the Petitioner does not need to be armed with a Judgment to invoke the presumption under s218. Nevertheless and unfortunately, many judges and the official receivers department seek this (a judgment) as a “prerequisite”. .

The Court of Appeal affirmed that “It is not provided under the Act that a petitioner must be armed with a judgment debt prior to the filing of a petition to wind up a company” (Syarikat Mohd Noor Yusof Sdn Bhd v Polibina Engineering Enterprise Sdn Bhd (in liquidation) – COA [2006] 1 MLJ 446)

“Under s218(2)(a) of the Act, once a notice to pay a debt has been served on a company, the company has to meet the presumptive challenge of the section by disputing the existence of the debt which can be done by either showing that the debt is non-existent or that the petitioner is not its creditor.” (Tan Ah Teck (t/a Plumcon Plumbing & Construction Co) v Coffral (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd – HC [1992] 1 MLJ 553)


The Debt - A liberal interpretation

4) Being a statutory right, the Federal Court decided that Courts ought to adopt a liberal interpretation in considering of the provisions of s218(2)(a) of the Companies Act and even a demand not specifying an exact sum was deemed sufficient. Commercial reality demands of this liberal interpretation otherwise leaving this section an absurdity. The leading case of Re Fabo Pty applied. The Courts are looking into the commercial insolvency of the company rather than technical objections of the demand.

“The court should adopt a liberal interpretation when considering the provisions of s218(2)(a)of the Act. The adoption of a literal interpretation would be difficult as it would compel the court not to make a winding up order notwithstanding the existence of clear evidence that an undisputed sum exceeding RM500 has remained unpaid after a demand made without any reasonable explanation for the failure to pay. Further, commercial reality demands that liberal interpretation be adopted.

A notice of demand under s218 need not specify the exact sum due as at the date of demand. So long the sum due exceeded RM500 and remained unpaid after the demand made without any reasonable explanation to the satisfaction of the court, there is therefore neglect to pay such sum within the meaning of the section” (Malaysia Air Charter Co Sdn Bhd v Petronas Dagangan Sdn Bhd – FC [2000] 4 MLJ 657)

A statutory right/ Commercial Insolvency

5) In any event, the right to present a Petition is a statutory one and cannot be taken away unless the company/Plaintiff can seriously challenge and prove that the debt is substantially and bona fide disputed. Furthermore, the party must prove that they are able to pay the debt and are not commercially insolvent.

6) Following the Privy Council, Sri Hartamas Development Sdn Bhd v MBF Finance Bhd – SC [1992] 1 MLJ 313 decided that, “In dealing with ‘commercial insolvency’, that is, of a company being unable to meet current demands upon it, we would respectfully follow the Privy Council in the Malayan Plant case and cite the following observations from Buckley on the Companies Act (13th Ed) at p 460:In such a case it is useless to say that if its assets are realized there will be ample to pay twenty shillings in the pound: this is not the test. A company may be at the same time insolvent, and wealthy. It may have wealth locked up in investments not presently realizable; but although this be so, yet if it have not assets available to meet its current liabilities it is commercially insolvent and may be wound up”

Conclusion

Alas, as aforemetioned, many courts seek a judgment as a “prerequisite” before the Winding-Up..

Wednesday, May 14, 2008

Removal of Liquidators, Quickson & the Deloitte’s case

Section 108(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986
Section 108(2) provides that the "court may, on cause shown, remove a liquidator and appoint another."


Quickson (South & West) Ltd v Katz [2004]

In recent times there has been case law when the Court has required some “show cause” reflecting characteror unfitness. This has been correctly "re-aligned" when the Court has said that there is no need for such special circumstances - Ehterton J in Quickson

Etherton J in Quickson,
…………… therefore, that it is quite clear from the entire line of authority stretching back to 1867 that, in appropriate circumstances, there may be good cause to remove a liquidator, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to prove misfeasance as such, and even though no reasonable criticism can be made of his conduct.
In my judgment, that summary of the application of the legal principles to the present case is too narrow and too rigid, and does not properly reflect the broad discretion of the court under IA s.108(2). It appears to be an analysis which has transformed the observation of Neuberger J in AMP Enterprises that the court expects any liquidator to be efficient and vigorous and unbiased in his conduct of the liquidation (at para [23]) into a pre-condition of removal under s.108(2) that, in order to succeed, the applicant must show that the liquidator has failed to act in an efficient, vigorous and unbiased manner, and will continue to fail to do so in the future.

Neuberger J himself emphasised (at para [21]) that it is inappropriate to lay down what facts will and what facts will not constitute sufficient grounds for removal under s.108(2). In that case, he made helpful and practical comments that it should not be seen to be easy to remove a liquidator merely because it can be shown that in one or more respects his conduct has fallen short of the ideal, and it is necessary to bear in mind the expense and disruption of a substitute appointment. Similarly, as I have already said, Nourse LJ in Edennote (at p.398) observed that the creditors’ lack of confidence in the liquidator must be reasonable, and the court will pay due regard to the impact of removal on the liquidator’s professional standing and reputation. Factors such as those might, taking into account all the circumstances, warrant a refusal to remove a liquidator even where there are reasonable criticisms that can be made of the liquidator’s conduct of the liquidation.

On the other hand, it is quite clear from the entire line of authority stretching back to 1867 that, in appropriate circumstances, there may be good cause to remove a liquidator, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to prove misfeasance as such, and even though no reasonable criticism can be made of his conduct: see Millett J in Re Keypak Homecare at p.416, approved by the Court of Appeal in Re Edennote at p.398.

In my judgment, the touchstone for an appraisal of whether good cause has been shown for the removal of a liquidator is the principle stated by Bowen LJ in Re Adam Eyton (at p.306) :


"The due cause is to be measured by reference to the real, substantial, honest interests of the liquidation, and to the purpose for which the liquidator is appointed."

See Also
Deloitte’s case Privy Council Appeal No. 44 of 1998

1. The statutory jurisdiction to remove a liquidator.
The companies legislation which was under consideration by the Court of Appeal was the Companies Law (1995) Revision. The legislation has since been consolidated and revised as the Companies Law (1998) Revision. The parties are agreed that there are no material differences between the two, though the section numbers have been altered as a result of the addition of a new section 4 in the 1998 Revision. Their Lordships will refer to the provisions of the 1995 Revision. The legislation is based upon the English Companies Act 1862.

Section 106(1) provides:-
“(1) Any official liquidator may resign or be removed by the Court on due cause shown; and any vacancy in the office of an official liquidator appointed by the Court shall be filled by the Court.”

It is common ground that this section applies not only to a compulsory liquidation but also (by virtue of section 153) to a liquidation which is continuing subject to the supervision of the court. The corresponding section which applies to a voluntary winding up is section 143. This provides:-
“143. If, from any cause whatever, there is no liquidator acting in the case of a voluntary winding up, the Court may, on the application of a contributory appoint a liquidator or liquidators; and the Court may, on due cause shown, remove any liquidator and appoint another liquidator to act in the matter of a voluntary winding up.”

Their Lordships make two observations on these sections. In the first place, each of the sections has two limbs, one enabling the court to appoint a liquidator to fill a vacancy, and the other enabling it to remove a liquidator for cause. In the second place, save in the case of the appointment of a liquidator in a voluntary winding up where the application must be made by a contributory, there is no express restriction on the category of person who may make the application. Where an insolvent company is being voluntarily wound up, it appears that a creditor who wishes to apply for the appointment of a liquidator must either petition for a compulsory winding up or apply for the liquidation to continue under the supervision of the court.

In the course of argument reference was made to the cases on the corresponding statutory provisions in England. For convenience, therefore, their Lordships set out the terms of the relevant English section which corresponds to section 106 of the 1995 Revision. This is section 108 of the Insolvency Act 1986, which provides:-
“(1) If from any cause whatever there is no liquidator acting, the court may appoint a liquidator.

(2) The court may, on cause shown, remove a liquidator and appoint another.”

It will be seen that the two sections are in largely similar terms. Each contains the same two limbs; neither prescribes the person or persons who may make the application.

The appellants submit that as a matter of ordinary construction section 106 confers on the court a power to remove a liquidator for cause without any limitation on the category of person who may make the application. They draw a contrast with other sections of the Companies Law which do contain such a limitation. Section 95, for example, restricts the right to apply to the court for the winding up of a company to creditors and contributories. Sections 102 (application for a stay of proceedings), 140 (determination of questions in a winding up), and 143 (set out above) all contain express restrictions on the person or persons who may make the application. By contrast section 106 contains no requirement that the applicant should be a creditor or contributory, or that he should have a direct financial interest in the conduct of the liquidation. There is certainly no express requirement and, it is said, none should be implied, since it is impossible to foresee all the circumstances which may justify the removal of a liquidator.

The appellants concede that not everyone is a proper person to make the application. They submit that any person who has an interest in making the application or who may be affected by its outcome is a proper person to make it. They say that they are such persons since they are critically affected by decisions which the liquidators will make in the conduct of the proceedings which the Company has brought against them. The real question is whether they can establish due cause for the removal of the respondents as liquidators. This, it is submitted, is a separate question which can only be determined after a full investigation of the grounds upon which the removal of the liquidator is sought. Unless obviously ill founded, they submit, an allegation of impropriety could not be summarily dismissed without investigation; and an alleged conflict of interest is in like case. It is not to be supposed that the court would lightly permit its own officers to place themselves in a position where their interest conflicts with their duty.

The appellants have cited numerous authorities on the circumstances in which the English Court will exercise its power to remove a liquidator for cause. Their Lordships do not find them helpful to the appellants. They show that impropriety is not necessary; that it is sufficient to satisfy the court that the removal of the liquidator will be for the general advantage of the persons interested in the liquidation; that in the absence of impropriety the court will have regard to the wishes of the majority of those interested; but that where impropriety is shown the court may override their wishes. They do, however, show that the court has consistently regarded the creditors (in the case of an insolvent liquidation) and the contributories (in the case of a solvent liquidation) as the proper persons to make the application, being the only persons interested in the liquidation. Their Lordships have not been shown any case in which the court has removed a liquidator who is able and willing to act on the application of anyone who is not a creditor or contributory as the case may be.

The appellants place much reliance on recent cases in England under section 108(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986. They have been concerned with the situation which arises when an office-holder with numerous appointments is incapable of continuing in office. Where he has automatically vacated office on having his authorisation withdrawn, the court has appointed another office-holder in his place on the application of the former office-holder himself, his former partners, the Secretary of State, and the Insolvency Practitioners Association. The court has also acceded to an unopposed application by the former partners of an office-holder who has resigned from his firm and is unable to continue in consequence to remove him and appoint another partner in his place. In all these cases the applicant has had a professional or official responsibility to bring to the attention of the court the existence of a large number of vacancies which needed to be filled. The only question of substance was whether it was necessary to incur the expense and delay of calling meetings of the creditors in every case in order to fill them. The court was prepared to remove the office-holder and thus create the vacancies it was asked to fill only where the office-holder accepted that he was incapable of acting. In such a case it recognised the reality of the situation, which was that the office was to all intents and purposes already vacant. But it refused the application and left the decision to the creditors where the office-holder, though unwilling to continue in office, was capable of doing so: see In re Sankey Furniture Ltd. [1995] 2 B.C.L.C. 594 and In re A. & C. Supplies Ltd. [1998] 1 B.C.L.C. 603.

In their Lordships’ opinion two different kinds of case must be distinguished when considering the question of a party’s standing to make an application to the court. The first occurs when the court is asked to exercise a power conferred on it by statute. In such a case the court must examine the statute to see whether it identifies the category of person who may make the application. This goes to the jurisdiction of the court, for the court has no jurisdiction to exercise a statutory power except on the application of a person qualified by the statute to make it. The second is more general. Where the court is asked to exercise a statutory power or its inherent jurisdiction, it will act only on the application of a party with a sufficient interest to make it. This is not a matter of jurisdiction. It is a matter of judicial restraint. Orders made by the court are coercive. Every order of the court affects the freedom of action of the party against whom it is made and sometimes (as in the present case) of other parties as well. It is, therefore, incumbent on the court to consider not only whether it has jurisdiction to make the order but whether the applicant is a proper person to invoke the jurisdiction.

Where the court is asked to exercise a statutory power, therefore, the applicant must show that he is a person qualified to make the application. But this does not conclude the question. He must also show that he is a proper person to make the application. This does not mean, as the appellants submit, that he “has an interest in making the application or may be affected by its outcome”. It means that he has a legitimate interest in the relief sought. Thus even though the statute does not limit the category of person who may make the application, the court will not remove a liquidator of an insolvent company on the application of a contributory who is not also a creditor: see In re Corbenstoke Ltd. (No.2) (1989) 5 B.C.C. 767. This case was criticised by the appellants: their Lordships consider that it was correctly decided.

The standing of an applicant cannot therefore be considered separately and without regard to the nature of the relief for which the application is made. Section 106(1) does not limit the category of persons who may make the application. The appellants, therefore, do not lack a statutory qualification to invoke the section. But the question remains whether they have a legitimate interest in the relief which they seek. They are not asking the court to appoint a liquidator to fill a vacancy. They are asking the court to remove incumbent liquidators for cause. The English cases relied upon by the appellants show that an interest which is sufficient to support an application of the former kind may not be sufficient to support an application of the latter kind.

The Company is insolvent. The liquidation is continuing under the supervision of the court. The only persons who could have any legitimate interest of their own in having the respondents removed from office as liquidators are the persons entitled to participate in the ultimate distribution of the Company’s assets, that is to say the creditors. The respondents are willing and able to continue to act, and the creditors have taken no step to remove them. The appellants are not merely strangers to the liquidation; their interests are adverse to the liquidation and the interests of the creditors. In their Lordships’ opinion, they have no legitimate interest in the identity of the liquidators, and are not proper persons to invoke the statutory jurisdiction of the court to remove the incumbent office-holders.

The appellants’ case is not advanced by alleging that the respondents have a conflict of interest. This is not the same as impropriety or want of probity. Their Lordships observe that the expression “conflict of interest” is an abbreviation for “conflict of interest and duty”. The rule is that a fiduciary may not without the informed consent of his principal place himself in a position where his interest may conflict with his duty to the principal. The danger is that his interest may affect him in the discharge of his duty to the prejudice of his principal. The only persons with a legitimate interest in complaining of a breach of the rule are the persons to whom the duty is owed; and they may waive the breach. The appellants do not allege that the respondents have an interest which conflicts with any duty owed to them. They do not plead any such duty. They allege that the respondents have an interest which conflicts with their duty to the Company and its creditors. If such a conflict exists, it is for the creditors alone to decide what if anything to do about it.

2. The inherent jurisdiction of the Court over its own officers.
As liquidators of the Company the respondents are officers of the court. The court’s inherent jurisdiction to control the conduct of its own officers is beyond dispute. But it does not follow that the appellants are proper persons to invoke that jurisdiction. They say that the respondents are behaving unconscionably by reason of their conflict of interest. But they cannot say that the respondents are acting unconscionably to them.

The appellants complain of the manner in which the respondents have conducted the proceedings against them in Cause 104. Thus they make the application as defendants to existing proceedings. They do not allege that those proceedings disclose no cause of action or are an abuse of the process of the court. If such were the case, the appellants would have an obvious remedy. They complain that the respondents have not made Coopers & Lybrand UK defendants to Cause 104. But the appellants have the remedy in their own hands. If they want to make Coopers & Lybrand UK parties to the action, they can bring them in themselves as third parties. They complain that the respondents, being the persons in control of the proceedings on behalf of the Company, have interests which conflict with those of the Company and may accordingly not properly discharge their duties to the Company. It is strange to hear defendants complain that the proceedings against them may not be pursued with sufficient vigour. If the Company were not in liquidation, the appellants could not be heard to complain of such conduct on the part of its directors. It would be a matter within the exclusive competence of the shareholders. Their Lordships do not accept that the fact that the Company is in insolvent liquidation and that the liquidators’ duties are owed to the creditors rather than the shareholders gives the appellants a standing to complain which they would not otherwise have had.


Their Lordships consider that the answer they have returned to the first question effectively disposes of this question also. They will humbly advise Her Majesty that the appeal and the petition for special leave should both be dismissed. The appellants must pay the respondents’ costs of both the appeal and the petition before their Lordships’ Board.